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Foreword 
Debate about the implications of the ageing character of our society has so far been directed 
towards economic issues, including imbalances in wealth and economic opportunities across 
the generations. It is now time for us to start considering the civic implications of inequalities 
arising from Britain's ageing society. 
The analysis set out in this paper by Dr Craig Berry shows that, if current trends continue, 
older cohorts may well come to exercise a disproportionate influence on the democratic 
process in future decades. We could be witnessing a fundamental reconfiguration of the 
electorate, which is putting more power into the hands of older people and reducing that 
which younger cohorts possess. 
Dr Berry's paper illustrates that the life-stages of voters matter more and more in our 
democracy. Understanding the significance and nature of age-based inequalities should 
form an important part of the agenda of those committed to the cause of reforming our 
political system. An electorate which includes a growing number of older people generates 
new imbalances in terms of voter turnout, voter registration, party support and the social and 
generational composition of the legislature. The coalition government's proposed changes to 
the system of voter registration, for instance, require particularly careful scrutiny if they are to 
avoid making generational inequalities worse. 
The paper also points to a number of signs that young people themselves are acutely aware 
of their growing disenfranchisement, and are adopting various attitudes and behaviours in 
response to it. Policy-makers, political parties and civil society organisations need to take 
notice of the signs that young people feel alienated and distant from political processes. 
Many are turned off both by the ways in which our political life is conducted, and by a 
pervasive sense of powerlessness in relation to the issues that are affecting their own 
economic and social prospects. This sense of alienation has arguably deepened during the 
current economic downturn, which is having an enormous impact upon the fortunes and life-
chances of many young people. 
The research contained in this paper ought to kick-start a debate about the political, as well 
as economic, implications of imbalances between the generations. It also points to the 
urgency, and difficulty, of the challenge this issue poses for politicians and political parties. 
Looking at democracy through a generational lens undoubtedly has its limitations, since this 
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is only one of the dimensions of ‘identity’ that affects our lives as citizens. And we should 
remember the many bonds that bring us together across the age divide. 
But ignoring the ever more apparent inequalities associated with demographic change is no 
longer a viable option. We need increasingly to grasp and to address the reasons for the 
alienation of many young people from our political system. This paper suggests that 
generational inequality represents one of the most important of these reasons. 
 
Professor Michael Kenny, Queen Mary University of London
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Executive summary 
The ageing of the electorate means that there is emerging an intergenerational democratic 
deficit whereby young cohorts are marginalised within the democratic process – this 
obviously has negative implications for young people, but also the legitimacy of 
representative democracy more generally. While it may be premature or sensationalist to 
proclaim the rise of a ‘gerontocracy’, it is clear that today’s young people have become 
relatively disenfranchised, both by the ageing of the electorate and wider features of the 
democratic process that appear to favour older cohorts.  
Unless the political marginalisation of young people abates, we are in danger of creating 
‘generation D’, a succession of disenfranchised cohorts with little say in how their society is 
governed. Today’s young people (‘generation Y’ or ‘the jilted generation’) are suffering a 
democratic deficit, but we can expect this trend to accelerate in coming decades. The paper 
assesses the extent of the democratic deficit experienced by younger cohorts by calculating 
the political power of voters at different life-stages, now and in the future. However, it will 
also examine the democratic process to detail the means by which young people are 
relatively excluded from mainstream politics more generally, arguing that even if cohort sizes 
were equal, a democratic deficit would result from the inability of the UK political system to 
mobilise and genuinely respond to young people’s perspectives. 
The first section, on democracy and intergenerational equity, considers both the role of 
democracy in questions around intergenerational equity, and also the relationship between 
generational change and democracy. It argues that demographic change matters to 
democracy, more than has so far been acknowledged, and that life-stage and generational 
identity matter to political behaviour such as voting. The disenfranchisement of younger 
cohorts could therefore have deleterious consequences for the legitimacy of representative 
democracy. This section also considers the status of future generations within democracy, 
that is, citizens not yet born. Despite the rhetorical commitment to protecting future 
generations often used by governments to justify policy decisions, the state appears to have 
increased its capacity and willingness to burden citizens not yet alive – perhaps inevitable 
given the greater numbers of people in the electorate towards the end of their life. The 
nature and extent of our obligations to future generations will be tested by population ageing. 
The second section details the specific features of the democratic deficit, initially by 
analysing the ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ voting power of different age cohorts of voters. Clearly, 
the ageing of the electorate has already begun. At the 2010 general election, 40-somethings 
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were dominant at the ballot box. The youngest voters, and voters in their early-30s, were 
particularly disadvantaged. There were more potential voters aged 50, 51, 52 or 63 than any 
single age between 31 and 36, more potential voters aged 62 than any single age between 
32 and 35, and more potential voters aged 50, 51 or 63 than aged 18. The potential voting 
power of people approaching retirement in 2010, whose life chances will be affected by 
electoral outcomes to a far lesser extent than younger voters, is therefore highly significant. 
By 2021, 50-something potential voters will be dominant. There will be only 708,000 18 year-
old potential voters, and 702,000 19 year-old potential voters (compared to a single-year age 
cohort average size of 902,000 for 50-somethings) – single-year cohort sizes across the age 
distribution will not drop below this level until age 65. Thirty years later, in 2051, there will be 
a particularly powerful set of cohorts aged around 60. The average single-year cohort size 
for people aged 58-62 will be 937,000. There will be only 825,000 18 year-old voters, and no 
smaller cohort up to age 68.  
Due to increasing survival rates, and the ageing of the members of the large baby booms of 
the immediate post-war era, the overriding trend is towards an older electorate, with greater 
concentrations of potential voting power among people in their 50s and 60s. This is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, or more accurately, one we are yet to fully experience. The 
median potential voter was 46 in 2010. In 2021 this will rise to 47. The median potential voter 
will be aged 50 by 2041, and 51 in 2051. The median potential voter in 1981 was already 
aged 46; this fell to 44 in 1991, before rising to 45 in 2001. 
Taking voter turnout rates into account shows that the democratic process was even more 
skewed towards older cohorts. The median actual voter was aged 49 in 2010, three years 
older than the median potential voter. The median actual voter will be 52 by 2021, rising to 
54 by 2051. 
At the 2010 general election, 40-somethings were largely successful into converting their 
potential voting power into actual power. But power was more skewed to people in their late 
rather than early-40s, and older cohorts had closed the gap significantly. Excluding 40-
somethings, there were more actual voters aged 63 than any other age. Given their lower 
propensity to vote, 18 year-olds exercised less actual voting power at the 2010 general 
election than 73 year-olds. 45 year-olds exercised 84 per cent more actual voting power than 
18-year olds, and 50 year-olds exercised 62 per cent more. 
Furthermore, the power of older cohorts in the democratic process over the next few 
decades will become formidable. In 2021, 18-year olds will exercise less actual voting power 
than 79 year-olds. 40 year-olds will exercise 83 per cent more power than 18 year-olds, and 
for 50 year-olds it will be 97 per cent more. Similarly, 55 year-olds will exercise more than 
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double (115 per cent) more power than 18 year-olds, and 60 year-olds will exercise 95 per 
cent more. In 2031, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual power than 84 year-olds. They will 
be particularly disadvantaged in comparison to, for example, 40 year-olds and 45 year-olds, 
who will exercise 73 per cent and 71 per cent more power respectively. 65 year-olds will 
exercise 73 per cent more voting power than 18 year-olds, and even 70 year-olds will 
exercise 51 per cent more. In 2041, people aged both 50 and 55 will exercise 84 per cent 
more actual power than 18 year-olds, and people aged 60 will exercise 62 per cent more. 
Even voters in their early-70s will exercise significantly more power than 18 year-olds, that 
is, 56 per cent. By 2051, if turnout rates persist, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual power 
than a typical single-year cohort in their late-80s. 40 year-olds will exercise 83 per cent more 
power than 18 year-olds, and 50 year-olds will exercise 62 per cent more. For 60 year-olds 
the figure will be even larger, that is, 92 per cent. 
There are interesting results concerning the influence of geography on the intergenerational 
democratic deficit. Combining population data disaggregated by parliamentary constituency, 
and results from the Voter Power Index, suggests that constituencies with the highest 
concentration of young cohorts are likely to hold greater sway at elections than, for instance, 
constituencies with the highest concentration of 50-somethings. However, this gap does not 
pertain when seats with a high proportion of young people and seats with a high proportion 
of 60-somethings. Furthermore, the apparent bias of current electoral system in favour of 
young people is rendered negligible or even non-existent by turnout rates, and will in any 
case lessen in future elections. 
The second section also discusses wider features of the democratic process in detailing 
young people’s disenfranchisement. For instance, young people are far less likely to be 
registered to vote – registration rates are 55 per cent for people aged 18-24, but 90 per cent 
for people aged 55-64, and 94 per cent for people aged 65 or over. Moves towards 
individual voter registration will exacerbate this problem. Young people are cynical about the 
formal political system, and favour forms of political participation which are not rewarded 
within the democratic process. In particular, the nature, internal organisation and privileged 
role of political parties within the democratic process serves to minimise the possibility of 
young people’s perspectives being heard. 
The third section of the paper considers a series of possible solutions to the 
intergenerational democratic deficit. It would of course be impossible, on the basis of the 
analysis here, to make strong recommendations for overcoming the intergenerational 
democratic deficit. The paper argues, however, that change is required across six key areas: 
the composition of the electorate; the voting process; encouraging participation; democratic 
institutions; wider reforms to governance procedures; and the protection owed to future 
	  	  
	  
8	  
citizens. Potential changes within each category range from relatively conservative, 
piecemeal interventions to radical transformations in democratic practice. For instance, in 
relation to the electorate, a conservative measure would be to lower the voting age to 16, 
and a more radical measure would be to ensure a proportionate age distribution within each 
parliamentary constituency. In relation to democratic institutions, measures could range from 
establish forums of young people with advisory status in legislatures, to quotas of young 
people with voting power within legislatures, and to protect future citizens measures could 
range from a requirement to calculate the impact of policy decisions on future generations, to 
legal limits on the burden that governments can place on future citizens. The most promising 
ideas for addressing the intergenerational democratic deficit, as presented in this paper, 
include: 
• Lowering the voting age to 16. The impact of this measure on the intergenerational 
democratic deficit would be fairly limited in aggregate terms, given the small 16 and 
17 year-old cohort sizes. However, 16 and 17 year-olds are themselves 
unenfranchised by the current electoral system, and therefore there is an 
overwhelming case for votes at 16 based on human rights alone. 
• Political training. Young people favour forms of participation that are not rewarded 
by the formal democratic process; for instance, even young people already active in 
politics are cynical about involvement in political parties. Other sources of training are 
therefore required, enabling the political activities undertaken by young people to be 
more impactful upon formal politics, and encouraging young activists to demonstrate 
leadership in encouraging more young people to get involved in politics. 
• Forums of young people in legislatures and/or designated seats for young 
people in legislatures. For understandable (albeit regrettable) reasons, young 
people are less likely to be adequately represented within legislatures such as the 
House of Commons. Forums of young people co-opted into an advisory role would 
ensure that their perspective is heard within the democratic process. More radically, 
a small number of seats (or a single seat) could be elected only by voters under a 
certain age – the legislative power of members elected by this method would be 
negligible, but they would become the voice of young people within the democratic 
process. A similar mechanism could be established for the ‘oldest old’ to minimise 
the perception of young people being unfairly privileged. 
• Greater support for young election candidates. The case for all-young people 
shortlists is not as clear-cut as the case for all-women shortlists. Yet even if political 
parties do not guarantee selection for young potential candidates, they could: 
guarantee that a certain number of young people are shortlisted for candidacy; 
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guarantee at least one young candidate in multi-member constituencies; or, ensure 
young people are included and highly placed within list-based electoral systems. 
• Stronger rules ensuring that the impacts of policy decisions on young people 
are calculated. The costs and benefits of all major policy and expenditure decisions 
– and crucially, decisions with cross-governmental implications such as budgets and 
spending reviews – for all age cohorts over their lifecourse should be independently 
assessed. Young cohorts and older cohorts should not be combined in a single age 
‘equality strand’. There may be an enhanced role for the Office for Budget 
Responsibility in this regard, or more radically, an ombudsman for young people. 
• An independent commission for future generations. Strict limits on the burdens 
that current citizens may place on citizens not yet alive may not be realisable in 
practice. However, a permanent commission could be established, with legal 
authority independent of government, to adjudicate on the likely future impacts. The 
commission would be able to alter or reverse government decisions.
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Introduction 
The political power of older cohorts risks the relative disenfranchisement of young people. 
An emerging ‘intergenerational democratic deficit’, furthermore, puts the legitimacy of the 
democratic process in jeopardy. Politicians’ deference to the ‘grey vote’ has become a truism 
of contemporary politics; it refers principally to the fact that older people are more likely to 
vote, and are therefore more important to the electioneering of political parties. This is 
certainly the case, but this does not mean that the intergenerational democratic deficit, 
because it apparently derives from young people’s apathetic nature, is somehow tolerable. 
That we have bred a generation unwilling to participate in the democratic process should be 
a major cause of concern, whatever the cause. Moreover, the grey vote cliché is based not 
only on the higher turnout of older voters, but also the open secret of demographic change: 
simply, the electorate has aged rapidly in recent years, and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future. Worryingly, however, we have barely even begun to consider what the 
implications of population ageing will be for the foundations and operation of democracy. 
The intergenerational democratic deficit does not derive simply from the fact that there are 
more voters, both potential and actual, among older cohorts, nor even that the wider 
democratic system serves to marginalise the perspective of young people. These 
circumstances only matters if we can establish that age matters. Crucially, therefore, recent 
analysis of political changes associated with the baby boomers exposes two key realities of 
democratic life and intergenerational relations: firstly, an individual’s life-stage has a crucial, 
albeit not decisive, impact on their political interests and behaviour. And secondly, larger 
age-based cohorts have a more significant impact on culture, institutions and ultimately 
policy than smaller cohorts. Throughout its relatively recent history, representative 
democracy has operated within the context of a pyramid-shaped age distribution across the 
population. The people affected for longest by the outcomes of the democratic process had, 
at least in theory, the largest influence at the ballot box. How to maintain the legitimacy of 
democracy in an ageing society is a question that must urgently be addressed. 
This paper argues that, unless the political marginalisation of young people abates, we are in 
danger of creating ‘generation D’, a succession of disenfranchised cohorts with little say in 
how their society is governed.1 Today’s young people (‘generation Y’ or ‘the jilted 
generation’) are suffering a democratic deficit, but we can expect this trend to accelerate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Generation	  Y	  is	  usually	  assumed	  to	  refer	  to	  people	  born	  between	  1981	  and	  2000,	  that	  is,	  today’s	  young	  
people.	  Because	  the	  youngest	  age	  cohort	  included	  in	  this	  paper’s	  quantitative	  analysis	  will	  be	  aged	  18	  in	  2051,	  
we	  can	  refer	  to	  generation	  D	  (for	  disenfranchised)	  as	  individuals	  born	  between	  2001	  and	  2033.	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coming decades. The paper assesses the extent of the democratic deficit experienced by 
younger cohorts by calculating the political power of voters at different life-stages, now and 
in the future. However, it will also examine the democratic process to detail the means by 
which young people are relatively excluded from mainstream politics more generally, arguing 
that even if cohort sizes were equal, a democratic deficit would result from the inability of the 
UK political system to mobilise and genuinely respond to young people’s perspectives. 
The first section explores the foundations of the paper’s analysis. It considers both the role 
of democracy in questions around intergenerational equity, and also the relationship 
between generational change and democracy. It argues that demographic change matters to 
democracy, more than has so far been acknowledged, and that life-stage and generational 
identity matter to political behaviour such as voting. The disenfranchisement of younger 
cohorts could therefore have deleterious consequences for the legitimacy of representative 
democracy. This section also considers the status of future generations within democracy, 
that is, citizens not yet born. The ability and willingness of democratically elected 
governments to burden future citizens financially, therefore restricting their democratic 
freedoms, appears to have increased dramatically in recent years. 
The second section details the specific features of the democratic deficit. It begins by 
analysing the ‘potential’ voting power of different age cohorts of voters, from 1981 to 2051. 
The ageing of the electorate is evident, with the youngest voters becoming significantly 
disadvantaged. But the disenfranchisement of young voters is even more glaring in terms of 
the ‘actual’ electorate, that is, the citizens that actually exercise their right to vote. While it is 
plausible, although I argue unfair, to respond that young people are choosing not to vote, it 
is nevertheless the case that governments will continue to be elected predominantly by older 
voters, and that the legitimacy of the democratic process is undermined as a result. 
The second section also discusses wider features of the democratic process in detailing 
young people’s disenfranchisement, such as low registration rates among young people, the 
divergence in the kind of political behaviour favoured by young people and the forms of 
political participation rewarded with voting power, and the nature and role of political parties. 
The influence of geography is also discussed in this section, by disaggregating the 
electorate into parliamentary constituencies. Although it appears that the current electoral 
system actually favours young people, this bias is rendered negligible by low turnout rates, 
and will in any case dissipate in future elections. 
The third section considers possible ‘solutions’ to the disenfranchisement of young people, 
that is, ways in which the electoral process and wider features of contemporary may be 
reformed to re-balance political power back towards those most likely to be affected by 
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decisions made by democratic institutions. Options are grouped into six categories 
representing aspects of democratic life in the UK: the composition of the electorate; the 
voting process; encouraging participation; democratic institutions; wider reforms to 
governance procedures; and the protection owed to future citizens. The paper argues that 
change is required across every category if the intergenerational democratic deficit is to be 
overcome, but potential changes within each category range from relatively conservative, 
piecemeal interventions to radical transformations in democratic practice. 
As indicated above, much of the paper is based on primary, quantitative research. The main 
sources used for this analysis were: 
• Population estimates (disaggregated by age and parliamentary constituency) 
published by the Office for National Statistics, including historical and projected data 
• Voter turnout data published in Ipsos MORI’s How Britain Voted series 
• The Voter Power Index compiled by the New Economics Foundation 
• Scott Davidson’s research for Age UK on ‘the grey vote’ within constituencies. 
The paper also involves secondary analysis based on a review of relevant literature. Much of 
the existing literature draws upon qualitative and quantitative studies of young people in the 
democratic system, such as the British Election Survey, small-scale studies undertaken by 
Matt Henn and Nick Foard, and Janine Dermody et al, a large-scale internet survey on 
political behaviour undertaken by Paul Whiteley, and my own research into the Labour 
Party’s youth sections. Findings from research undertaken by the Electoral Commission, 
particularly on voter registration, have also been incorporated. For the most part, the 
analysis draws upon evidence from the UK, but evidence on young people in other countries 
is included where appropriate. The discussion of possible solutions is based primarily on 
original political and policy analysis, but also uses the data sources listed above to assess 
the impact of lowering the voting age, and where appropriate draws upon the existing 
literature on some of the ideas discussed. 
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1. Democracy and intergenerational equity 
At the most basic level democracy means ‘one person, one vote’. Each citizen has as much 
right as everybody else to input into the processes through which society is governed, and 
as such democracy is the ultimate expression of political equality. 
We know, however, that this principle is refracted in practice by innumerable factors related 
to the cultural, economic and institutional context within which any system of democracy is 
established. The central question in this regard is whether or not citizens’ inputs are made 
directly, or via the election of representatives. As such, virtually all democracies are today 
representative democracies. And within the parameters of representative democracy, myriad 
complexities remain, such as: 
• the nature and role of political parties; 
• the process for electing representatives, including how the electorate is defined and 
which electoral system is adopted; 
• the nature and role of the media, through which the electorate obtains information 
about the democratic process; and 
• the nature and functions of the institutions, both legislative and executive, into which 
representatives are elected; 
• the levels of governance, both domestic and international, at which political decisions 
are made; and 
• the separation of powers between elected representatives and other constitutional 
bodies, such as the monarchy, the judiciary and the civil service. 
Population ageing presents a challenge to almost every social and economic practice, 
nowhere more so than countries like the UK. What is rarely considered, however, is the 
impact that ageing may be having on the democratic process. We assume that democracy, 
in its ideal form, is blind to demographic characteristics such as age, gender, sexual 
orientation and ethnicity – although there are many exceptions to this in current practice – 
but given the scale of population ageing, this may no longer be a viable position. Clearly, 
ageing impacts how many of the attendant features of representative democracy operate in 
practice. It may be, moreover, that even the basic principle of ‘one person, one vote’ is 
challenged when the individual voters in question are more likely to be older than at any 
other point in the modern history of democracy. 
Perhaps the central objection to the notion that democratic mechanisms should take into 
account the relative size of age cohorts within the electorate, is that cohorts do not vote as 
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generational blocs, or based solely on their age. While it may be possible to show that 
people in a single social class, gender, ethnicity or even locality tend to favour policies that 
promote their interests, so the argument goes, this is not the case with age. Mounting 
evidence suggests, however, that age does impact upon political preferences. Andy Furlong 
and Fred Cartmel’s research based on the British Election Survey 2009/10 demonstrates 
some key differences in how different generations conceive of the priorities for policy-
makers. When asked to list what they think are the three most important political issues, 
around three-quarters of all age groups surveyed included ‘the economy’, the most popular 
answer for every age group. However, while 57 per cent of female members of ‘generation 
Y’, and 49 per cent of male members,  also listed ‘unemployment’, only a third of women and 
a quarter of men in ‘the silent generation’, and 40 per cent of women and a third of men 
among ‘baby boomers’ identified this issue. Both the silent generation and baby boomers 
were more likely to identify ‘health care’ as a priority rather than unemployment; moreover, 
men in the silent generation were also significantly more likely to list ‘immigration’, and about 
as likely to list ‘the war in Afghanistan’.2 Furlong and Cartmel therefore point to a tendency 
for selfishness on the part of generations, including today’s young people, and conclude that 
generational differences in political priorities partly justify ‘young people’s claim that older 
people tend to marginalise their core concerns’.3  
In more general terms, recent analyses of intergenerational conflict by Ed Howker and Shiv 
Malik, in Jilted Generation, and current government minister David Willets, in The Pinch, 
demonstrate the close correlation – most apparent in the 1980s and 1990s – between the 
relative size of age cohorts and political decisions which favour the largest cohorts. While 
Howker and Malik refer to the ideological orientation of the baby boomers in particular, which 
to some extent permitted the pursuit of a selfish agenda, Willets presents such 
intergenerational conflict as an endemic feature of social and political life.4 That generations 
can act, more or less coherently, to bring about change in social structures was a proposition 
first put forward by Karl Mannheim in 1923. Mannheim, one of the founding fathers of 
modern sociology, believed that generational change was one of the main driving forces of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  In	  Furlong	  and	  Cartmel’s	  study,	  the	  silent	  generation	  are	  those	  born	  between	  1925	  and	  1945,	  baby	  boomers	  
are	  those	  born	  between	  1946	  and	  1964,	  generation	  X	  are	  those	  born	  between	  1965	  and	  1980,	  and	  generation	  
Y	  are	  those	  born	  between	  1981	  and	  2000.	  
3	  Furlong,	  Andy	  &	  Cartmel,	  Fred	  (2012)	  ‘Social	  change	  and	  political	  engagement	  among	  young	  people:	  
Generation	  and	  the	  2009/10	  British	  Election	  Survey’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs	  65(1),	  pp.	  13-­‐28.	  
4	  Howker,	  Ed	  &	  Malik,	  Shiv	  (2010)	  Jilted	  Generation:	  How	  Britain	  Has	  Bankrupted	  Its	  Youth	  (London:	  Icon);	  
Willets,	  David	  (2010)	  The	  Pinch:	  How	  the	  Baby	  Boomers	  Stole	  Their	  Children’s	  Future	  (London:	  Atlantic).	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political change. Strangely, this key precept of the discipline of sociology seems to have 
been largely overlooked by the study of democracy by political scientists.5 
This does not mean we should assume that the voting patterns of members of generations 
or age cohorts are perfectly aligned. Rather, it means we should recognise that people at the 
same life-stage ‘share formative experiences and develop common perspectives’ – and that 
political parties use this knowledge in forming electoral strategy.6 People of the same 
generation may well vote for different political parties, and their political preferences may 
change over time, but generally speaking generational perspectives will influence the broad 
political agenda within which all parties seek to garner support – this assumption is 
fundamental to the analysis of both Willets, and Howker and Malik. In crude terms: left and 
right still matter, but what left and right mean differs between generations. Furthermore, it is 
not difficult to accept that, at the individual level, a person’s stage of life and generational 
membership has an impact upon how and whether they engage with the democratic 
process. They act, politically, on the basis of their generation. People at the same life-stage, 
or of the same generation, may interpret their interests in an entirely different way – although 
the evidence suggests they do not – but this does not mean that perceptions of their 
generational interests are not crucial to their political behaviour. The assumption 
underpinning this paper’s analysis of the electorate and democratic process, therefore, is 
that if voters are prone to generational selfishness, then significant discrepancies in the 
political power of different cohorts – represented in both cohort size and actual contributions 
to the democratic process – are harmful to democracy. 
By definition, young people are more affected by the outcomes of the democratic process 
than other cohorts. Most obviously, their youth means that by and large they will live with the 
consequences of political decisions for longer. The nature of public policy, especially on 
issues that impact directly on intergenerational fairness such as the pensions system and 
infrastructure investment, is such that even where policy decisions are ostensibly ‘reversed’, 
the impact of the initial decision cannot be fully eliminated. Furthermore, young people are at 
a crucial life-stage – undertaking education and training, embarking on careers, forming 
families – where the impact of political decisions will have a decisive and cumulative effect 
on their socio-economic circumstances and life chances across their lifecourses. This is not 
to discount the impact of decisions on older cohorts, nor the importance of other life-stages, 
but nevertheless it remains that young people occupy a unique status within the democratic 
process. Indeed, for most of its history, representative democracy has functioned within a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Mannheim,	  Karl	  (1952;	  orig.	  1923)	  ‘The	  problem	  of	  generations’	  in	  Mannheim,	  Karl	  (ed.)	  Essays	  on	  the	  
Sociology	  of	  Knowledge	  (London:	  Routledge	  and	  Kegan	  Paul).	  
6	  Furlong	  &	  Cartmel	  (2012)	  ‘Social	  change…’	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pyramid-shaped age distribution across the population. While ‘one person, one vote’ is the 
basic principle of democracy, that young people – the age group most likely to be affected 
by the outcomes of the democratic process for the longest period of time – have been more 
populous than other age groups may in fact be one of the unwritten foundations of modern 
democracy. The kind of intergenerational conflict documented by Willets, and Howker and 
Malik, may be an early indication that an ageing society is unravelling the legitimacy of the 
democratic process. It is necessary to consider therefore whether the practice of democracy 
needs to evolve in tune with demographic change. 
It is perhaps because young people have traditionally been the most populous cohorts that 
representative democracies have been reluctant to grant them full status as citizens. Voting 
age in the UK did not fall to 18, from 21, until 1969. Suffrage for women, granted in 1918, did 
not apply to anybody aged under 30, although the voting age was equalised, at 21, ten years 
later. The age at which people can become a Member of Parliament was lowered to 18, from 
21, in only 2006. There is, it seems, a longstanding paternalistic attitude towards the political 
representation of young people. In 2011, public health minister Anne Milton advised that 
people under 45 should not enter politics. The comment gained attention because the Prime 
Minister was, at the time, aged 44 – but it perhaps speaks more widely to the perception that 
the possession of life experience based solely on age matters more than each individual’s 
right to contribute to the democratic perspective based on their own judgement and values.7 
As Furlong and Cartmel argue: 
when issues emerge that have a core relevance for young people, they are often 
tackled from a paternalistic and condescending ‘we know what’s best for you’ 
perspective or are addressed in ways that prioritise the interests of older 
generations. Hence, the debate about student finance was framed from an older 
tax payer, rather than from a contemporary consumer, perspective; discussion of 
the national debt crisis rarely addresses the immediate impact of reducing public 
spending on youth jobs or training; while unemployment policy tends to focus not 
so much on creating opportunities, but on tackling a perceived skill deficit and 
motivating young people who are presented as feckless and even as ‘inadequate 
citizens’.8 
Similarly, in 2009, the Ministry of Justice published a ‘young people’s guide’ to the green 
paper on the Bill of Rights and Responsibilities planned by the previous government. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Triggle,	  Nick	  (2011)	  ‘Under-­‐45s	  should	  not	  enter	  politics,	  minister	  says’,	  BBC	  News,	  12	  April	  2011,	  available	  at	  
www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-­‐13053341.	  	  
8	  Furlong	  &	  Cartmel	  (2012)	  ‘Social	  change…’,	  citing	  Harris,	  Anita	  et	  al	  (2010)	  ‘Beyond	  apathetic	  and	  activist	  
youth:	  “ordinary”	  young	  people	  and	  forms	  of	  political	  participation’	  in	  Young	  18(1),	  pp.	  9-­‐32.	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opinion of academics Andrew Mycock and Jonathan Tonge, ‘its focus was instructive, 
prioritising young people’s responsibilities ahead of rights, with scant acknowledgement of 
their political citizenship’.9 Indeed, the document endorses the view that, while children and 
young people have the right to be heard in decisions that may affect them, their opinions 
must be given ‘due weight’ in accordance with their age and maturity.10 
The experience argument is a strong one, but ultimately the perspective of young people 
within the democratic process in inimitable. Older cohorts will, of course, have been young 
once – but in almost all cases, in very different conditions from contemporary young people. 
That older people, in Milton’s words, ‘sort of know stuff’, is therefore not a valid justification 
for the partial exclusion, whether formally or informally, of young people from the democratic 
process. 
As noted above, the literature on intergenerational conflict suggested that the state has in 
the last three decades placed undue financial burdens on today’s young people; we can 
speculate that this may be a direct result of the disenfranchisement documented here. Just 
as important for the future of democracy may be the position of future generations of voters 
– both children, and people not yet alive. The state’s ability and willingness to burden future 
generations of voters (that is, the unenfranchised) appears to have increased dramatically in 
recent years. Public sector financing arrangements such as the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) ensure that current public services are delivered at the expense of future generations, 
and a financial crisis which occurred during the stewardship of the UK’s second (and final) 
baby boomer Prime Minister, resulted in enormous increases in government borrowing.11 
Unlike regular borrowing, PFI debts are held off the public sector balance-sheet – but both 
ensure that future voters, and taxpayers, are funding benefits enjoyed by today’s voters, 
both young and old. 
The coalition government’s austerity agenda has, of course, been explicitly prefaced by the 
need to protect future generations from the burden of public debt.12 However, in his 2012 
Budget, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne proposed the introduction of 100-year 
or even perpetual government bonds, which by definition would be serviced by future 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Mycock,	  Andrew	  &	  Tonge,	  Jonathan	  (2012)	  ‘The	  party	  politics	  of	  youth	  citizenship	  and	  democratic	  
engagement’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs	  65(1),	  pp.	  138-­‐161.	  
10	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (2009)	  Young	  People’s	  Guide	  to	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  Rights	  and	  Responsibilities,	  available	  
at	  dera.ioe.ac.uk/205/1/right-­‐responsibilities-­‐young-­‐people.pdf.	  	  
11	  On	  PFI,	  see	  Parker,	  David	  (2012)	  The	  Private	  Finance	  Initiative	  and	  Intergenerational	  Equity	  (The	  
Intergenerational	  Foundation),	  available	  at	  www.if.org.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/02/PFIs-­‐and-­‐
Intergenerational-­‐Equity.pdf.	  	  
12	  HM	  Treasury	  (2010)	  Spending	  Review	  2010,	  available	  at	  cdn.hm-­‐
treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf.	  	  
	  	  
	  
18	  
generations, in some cases for eternity.13 It is of course impossible today to assess 
decisively the democratic status of future citizens, and it would therefore be impossible to 
recommend reconstituting the democratic process on their behalf. Nevertheless, it is surely 
inconsistent with democracy that the statecraft of future citizens will be directly constrained, 
at least to some extent, by decisions taken today. This is not to say that the decisions on 
public sector finance taken by successive governments in recent decades are without merit 
and entirely illegitimate. Nor is it possible in this paper to seriously examine the principal 
justification for burdening future generations, that is, that society tends to become wealthier 
over time, and therefore these burdens will prove not to be as great as they appear today. 
Nevertheless, even if this assumption is sound, it is difficult to accept logically that it is 
sufficient justification for creating the risk that current practices will jeopardise the political 
citizenship of future generations. 
There seem to be solid grounds, therefore, for the judgement that as a psephological 
characteristic, age is not equivalent to other demographic characteristics such as social 
class, gender, disability, ethnicity and sexual orientation. Although some aspects of the wider 
democratic system do seek to advantage certain ‘minority’ groups in this regard, at the level 
of basic principle, and certainly in terms of the formal voting process, it is deemed correct 
that democratic mechanisms should be blind to these characteristics. Can differences based 
on age be treated in the same way? Logically, while there are few, if any, reasons to assume 
that political relations between people of different genders, ethnic identity, class, etc. will be 
fundamentally determined by the nature of these differences, age-based differences are 
probably ineradicable.  
Precisely this dilemma confronted renowned philosopher John Rawls in his attempt to 
construct and justify the social contract underpinning liberal democracies. Rawls imagined 
that behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, individuals with no knowledge of themselves, society or their 
role and status within it, would be enabled and indeed compelled to create a just social 
order. What he recognised, however, was that even if individuals could be imagined to exist 
beyond virtually every identifying characteristic, it was impossible to imagine individuals 
existing outside the passage of time. Related to this is the question of whether the parties to 
the social contract are all of the individuals alive at a given moment of time, or instead all 
individuals that have ever lived or that will ever live; in essence, Rawls is grappling with the 
dilemma of how people of different generations can be expected to co-exist in a just order, 
and of how people alive today should treat future generations. Rawls’ highly unsatisfactory 
solution was to decree that, behind the veil of ignorance, we are not simply abstract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Curtis,	  Polly	  (2012)	  ‘Budget	  2012:	  will	  100-­‐year	  bonds	  work?’	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  14	  March	  2012,	  available	  at	  
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/reality-­‐check-­‐with-­‐polly-­‐curtis/2012/mar/14/budget-­‐2012-­‐100-­‐year-­‐bonds.	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individuals, but rather ‘heads of families’. He anticipated that the head of a family would have 
not only their own generation’s welfare in mind when drafting the social contract, but also 
those of younger and future generations. Rawls therefore resorted to the paternalistic 
attitude criticised above: the disenfranchisement of young citizens, and citizens not yet alive, 
is justified solely by the greater experience of the passage of time of older citizens.14 
Every individual, at any moment in time, is at a particular life-stage (including those not yet 
alive). This life-stage influences not only how they choose to make use of their rights as 
citizens to input into the democratic process, but also the very nature of their citizenship. The 
third section of this paper will discuss what can be done to ensure that young people, given 
the unique nature of their status within democracy, are fully included in the democratic 
process. It would be wrong to assume, of course, that young people are a single bloc of 
voters who should somehow be simply weighted against other age-based blocs within the 
democratic process. Similarly, even where they occupy a similar life-stage, young people will 
perceive of the implications of this life-stage in different ways – as well as, more generally, 
upholding different values and policy positions. For these reasons, seeking to reconstruct 
almost a century’s worth of practice of mass democracy on the basis of an intergenerational 
democratic deficit would be unwise. However, it is vital the relations between and relative 
power of different generations in the democratic process is studied in greater detail, to 
enable the evolution of the democratic process in conjunction with demographic change. 
Strangely, while age-based differences matter far more to democracy, as argued above, 
than differences based on other demographic characteristics, they appear to have been 
studied far less. Rectifying this, albeit to a limited extent, is the task of the next section. 
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  John	  (1999;	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  1971)	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  Theory	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  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	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2. The intergenerational democratic deficit 
The potential power of different age cohorts 
As discussed in the previous section, while the principle of one person, one vote is 
fundamental to democracy, the centrality of our stage of life to the way that we perceive our 
interests – and therefore what we expect and demand from public authorities – means that 
there is something profoundly undemocratic about the concentration of voting power in a 
small number of age cohorts. 
At the 2010 general election, weight of numbers meant that potential voting power resided 
with people aged in their 40s, reflecting the baby boom of the 1960s.15 The median voter 
was 46 years old, and average single-year cohort size for people aged 40-49 was 920,000, 
compared to an average single-year cohort size of 673,000 for the electorate in general.16 In 
terms of potential voting power, people in their early-20s in 2010 were not that far behind – 
there was a mini-boom in the early-1990s – with an average single-year cohort size of 
862,000, significantly above the overall average. There were fewer voters in their late-20s 
(average cohort size of 850,000), but people in their early-30s were particularly 
disadvantaged in comparison to people in their 40s and early-20s (average single-year 
cohort size of 778,000). 
Given that survival rates decline as cohorts age, it is to be expected that people in later life 
have lower cohort sizes – the average single-year cohort size is negatively affected by the 
relatively low average cohort sizes for people in their 70s (447,000) and 80s (242,000). 
Despite this, the impact of earlier baby booms means that many older cohorts retain 
significant potential voting power. In 2010 there were more voters aged 50, 51, 52 or 63 than 
any age between 31 and 36, and more voters aged 62 than any aged between 32 and 35. 
Furthermore, the cohort aged 18 (808,000) was smaller than the cohorts aged 50, 51 and 
63. As such, the potential voting power of people approaching retirement in 2010, whose life 
chances will be affected by electoral outcomes to a far lesser extent than younger voters, 
remains significant. 
And population ageing means that these trends will persist and strengthen. In 2021, the 
median voter will be a year older than in 2010, 47 years old. Generally speaking, potential  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  1960s	  baby	  boom	  was	  not	  as	  large	  as	  that	  immediately	  following	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  –	  but	  people	  
born	  in	  the	  late-­‐1940s	  and	  early-­‐1950s	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  survived	  to	  their	  late-­‐50s	  and	  60s	  than	  people	  
born	  in	  the	  1960s	  are	  to	  have	  survived	  into	  their	  40s.	  
16	  People	  aged	  90	  or	  over	  are	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  cohort.	  In	  2010	  there	  were	  476,000	  people	  aged	  90	  or	  over,	  
compared	  to,	  for	  instance,	  153,000	  people	  aged	  89.	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voting power will have transferred to people in their 50s (the cohorts that had been in their 
40s at the 2010 general election) – they have an average single-year cohort size of 902,000, 
compared to 728,000 for the electorate in general.17 This is actually lower than the figure for 
people in their 30s in 2021 (average cohort size of 939,000) – the early-1990s baby 
boomers again, buttressed by immigration – but the youngest voters, people in their late-
teens and early-20s, will be particularly disadvantaged, with an average cohort size of 
735,000 for people aged between 18 and 22. There will be only 708,000 18 year-old and 
702,000 19 year-old potential voters; cohort size does not drop below these levels across 
the age range until age 65. 
In 2031, the median voter will have aged a further two years to 49. For the first time, really 
significant potential voting power will be exercised by people in their 60s, that is, the 50-
somethings from a decade before. Potential voters in their early-60s will have an average 
single-year cohort size of 861,000, compared to an electorate average of 780,000. The most 
populous cohorts will, however, be in their early-40s and to a lesser extent late-30s. For the 
first time, there will be more voters aged 90 or over (1,256,000) than in any single-year age 
cohort.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  does	  not	  release	  projections	  of	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  
sizes	  for	  the	  ages	  of	  85	  and	  above,	  although	  projections	  for	  five-­‐year	  cohort	  groups	  have	  been	  published.	  This,	  
however,	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  calculation	  of	  average	  single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  the	  electorate	  in	  general	  
(although	  see	  note	  2).	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By 2041 the median voter will have reached the age of 50. Cohorts of voters in their early-
50s will be particularly powerful, with an average single-year cohort size of 964,000, 
compared to 830,000 for the electorate in general. Reflecting the immigrant-led baby boom 
expected over the next few years, however, cohorts in their late-20s (with an average size of 
999,000) will have the most potential voting power. The youngest voters will be 
disadvantaged: there will be only 842,000 18 year-olds – cohort sizes do not drop below this 
figure until the age of 59. 
By 2051 the median voter will be 51. The late-20-somethings of 2041 will carry their potential 
voting power into their late-30s (average single-year cohort size of 1,032,000, compared to 
867,000 for the electorate in general). There will, however, be a particularly powerful set of 
cohorts aged around 60; people aged between 58 and 62 will have an average single-year 
cohort size of 937,000. The position of the youngest voters remains poor: there will be only 
825,000 18 year-olds, and no smaller cohort size across the age range until the age of 68. 
Given more recent and expected baby booms, it is certainly not the case that, in terms of 
potential voting power, young people will always be significantly disadvantaged compared to 
older cohorts. There will be elections in upcoming decades when some cohorts of 20-
somethings and 30-somethings will represent a significant bloc of potential voters (although 
this is not the case for the very youngest voters, who will live with the outcomes of elections 
for the longest). We should be wary of the dominance of any cohort within the democratic 
process, young or old. However, due to increasing survival rates, and the ageing of the 
members of the large baby booms of the immediate post-war era, the overriding trend is 
towards an older electorate, with greater concentrations of potential voting power among 
people in their 50s and 60s. As such, figure 1 charts the ageing of the median voter, and 
table 2 shows the relative potential voting power of selected younger and older voters over 
time. 
This is a relatively recent phenomenon – or perhaps more accurately, one we are yet to 
experience. In 1981, the median voter was the same age as in 2010, 46 years old. While 
there were a large number of voters aged around 60, reflecting the baby boom that followed 
the First World War, the largest cohorts were in their early-20s and early-30s.18 We can quite 
plausibly therefore refer to an early-1980s electorate as having potential voting power more 
concentrated in younger cohorts than today. The most populous single-year cohort was 34 
(948,000, compared to an average across the electorate of 574,000), but the second and 
third largest were 18 year-olds and 19 year-olds (939,000 and 927,000 respectively),  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  historical	  population	  data	  released	  by	  the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  does	  not	  
disaggregate	  that	  population	  aged	  85	  or	  above.	  This,	  however,	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  calculation	  of	  average	  
single-­‐year	  cohort	  size	  for	  the	  electorate	  in	  general	  (although	  see	  note	  2).	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Table	  2	  Relative	  sizes	  of	  selected	  single-­year	  cohorts	  
1981 1991 2001 2010 Age 
cohort % average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
18 164 150 120 118 114 105 120 110 
30 133 125 147 135 143 130 124 114 
50 111 102 97 89 118 111 124 114 
65 96 88 94 86 87 80 97 89 
2021 2031 2041 2051  
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
% average 
cohort size 
% average 
working-
age cohort 
18 97 93 111 110 101 102 95 98 
30 135 129 108 108 119 119 116 119 
50 123 117 109 109 119 119 98 101 
65 95 91 111 111 85 85 102 105 
 Source:	  original	  calculations	  based	  on	  ONS	  population	  estimates	  Figures	  correct	  to	  nearest	  per	  cent.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparison	  working-­‐age	  is	  constant	  at	  18-­‐64.	  
 
therefore foretelling the concentration of potential voting power among 40-somethings that 
we see today. 
By 1991, because longevity gains had yet be realised in full – therefore there were far fewer 
70-somethings than there had been 60-somethings a decade before – the age of the median 
voter had actually fallen by two years to 44. As we would expect, ten years on from 1981, 
potential voting power was concentrated among people in their late-20s and early-40s. In 
2001 the median voter was 45 years old. Potential voting power was concentrated among 
people in their 30s, with an average single-year cohort size of 922,000, compared to 
627,000 for the electorate in general. But there was also a concentration of potential voter 
power among people in their early-1950s: they had an average cohort size of 804,000, and 
the cohort aged 54 was more populous than any other cohort outside the 30-somethings. 
There were fewer potential voters aged 18 or 19 than any other age up to 56. 
Generally speaking, the young voters of twenty or thirty years ago were not out-voted to any 
significant extent by older voters. In terms of potential voting power, with limited exceptions, 
it is today’s generation of young voters, and even more so tomorrow’s generation, that are 
experiencing or will experience a democratic deficit. 
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The actual electorate 
The formal power wielded by different age cohorts within the democratic process is 
dependent of course not on potential voting power, but rather on actually voting. Other 
things being equal, it is bad for democracy that potential voting power at the 2010 general 
election was concentrated among 40-somethings. However, taking voter turnout rates into 
account shows that the democratic process was even more skewed towards older cohorts.19 
An appendix to this report addresses the objection that ‘young people choose not to vote’, 
but it suffices to say here that, even if differences in ‘actual’ voting power data are not 
deemed to constitute a ‘democratic deficit’, it remains important to determine the age 
distribution of the actual electors to whom elected governments are beholden. 
At the 2010 general election, the actual median voter was three years older than the 
potential media voter, 49 years old. As in the potential electorate, voting power in the actual 
electorate is concentrated among 40-somethings, albeit to a lesser extent, and given that 
turnout increases with age, skewed towards people in their late-40s rather than early-40s. 
The average single-year cohort size for actual voters aged 40-44 was 611,000, and for 
actual voters aged 45-50 the figure was 630,000 – this compares to an average single-year 
cohort size of 437,000 for the electorate in general. Unlike the potential electorate, average 
single-year cohort size for actual voters in their 20s (424,000) was below the overall 
average, and moreover, significantly below the average for actual voters in their 50s 
(536,000) and even 60s (497,000). Excluding 40-somethings, there were more actual voters 
aged 63 than any other single-year cohort. 
Given their lower propensity to vote, 18 year-olds exercised less actual voting power at the 
2010 general election than 73 year-olds. 45 year-olds exercised 84 per cent more actual 
voting power than 18-year olds, and 50 year-olds exercised 62 per cent more. Even people 
approaching retirement (that is, a typical single-year cohort in their early-60s) exercised 54 
per cent more actual voting power than 18 year-olds. 
Obviously it would be inappropriate to apply turnout rates to historical population data (age-
based differences in turnout have only recently been recorded by polling companies; they 
are not recorded by any public authority). However, it is reasonable to imagine the 
implications of similar turnout rates persisting in future elections.20 If turnout rates remain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Election	  turnout	  increases	  significantly	  with	  age.	  According	  to	  Ipsos	  MORI,	  turnout	  rates	  for	  the	  2010	  general	  
election	  were:	  18-­‐24	  year-­‐olds	  –	  44	  per	  cent;	  25-­‐34	  year-­‐olds	  –	  55	  per	  cent;	  35-­‐44	  year-­‐olds	  –	  66	  per	  cent;	  45-­‐
54	  year-­‐olds	  –	  69	  per	  cent;	  55-­‐64	  year-­‐olds	  –	  73	  per	  cent;	  people	  aged	  65	  or	  over	  –	  76	  per	  cent.	  Overall	  turnout	  
was	  65	  per	  cent.	  
20	  Having	  said	  this,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  considering	  that	  the	  intergenerational	  democratic	  deficit	  may	  have	  a	  
lifecourse	  impact	  on	  today’s	  young	  people,	  that	  is,	  they	  will	  remain	  disengaged	  from	  the	  democratic	  process	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stable as the electorate ages, the actual median voters age will rise from 49 in 2010 to 52 in 
2021. It will rise again to 53 in 2041, and then to 54 by 2051. 
Voting power in the actual electorate of 2021 will be concentrated among 50-somethings. 
The average single-year cohort size of actual voters aged between 50 and 59 will be 
640,000 compared an average for the overall actual electorate of 473,000. Their closest 
challengers, the 30-somethings – theoretically powerful in the 2021’s potential electorate – 
have an average single-year cohort size of 566,000. This is only just above the figure for 
people in their early-60s (565,000). The single-year average cohort size for the youngest 
actual voters (aged between 18 and 22) will be alarmingly low, that is, 323,000 – significantly 
lower than even people aged between 75 and 79 (383,000). 
Voting power in the actual electorate of 2031 will be concentrated in two main age groups: 
40-somethings and 60-somethings. People aged 40-49 will have an average single-year 
actual voters cohort size of 632,000, and for people aged 60-69 the figure will be 631,000 – 
the average for the actual electorate overall will be 507,000. People in their late-30s 
(622,000), 50s (561,000), and even early-70s (526,000) will not, however, be significantly far 
behind these groups. In contrast, actual voters aged between 18 and 22 will have an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
throughout	  their	  lives	  rather	  than	  increasing	  their	  voter	  turnout	  as	  they	  get	  older.	  This	  will	  be	  explored	  more	  
below.	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average single-year cohort size of 382,000. Based on 2010 turnout rates, in 2031 there will 
be more voters aged 84 than any single age between 18 and 22, or aged 24. 
The turnout rate means the potential voting power of people in their late-20s in 2041 will be 
largely forgone. They will have an average single-year cohort of actual voters of 549,000, 
around the average for the actual electorate in general (540,000). Actual voting power will be 
concentrated in people aged around 50: there will be an average of 646,000 voters at each 
age between 45 and 49, and 665,000 for ages between 50 and 54. Actual voters in their 
early-70s will have an average single-year cohort size of 594,000 – outstripping 20-
somethings, 30-somethings and even 60-somethings. Alarmingly, there will be fewer actual 
voters aged 18 than any other age until 84, and similarly, fewer actual voters aged 24 than 
any other age until 82. 
Voting power in the actual electorate of 2051 will be concentrated among people in their late-
30s, with an average actual voter single-year cohort size of 681,000, compared to an overall 
average of 564,000. Actual voters in their late-50s (670,000) and early-60s (677,000) will, 
however, follow very closely behind. Actual voters in their early-50s and late-60s will also be 
powerful in terms of actual voting power, in contrast with actual voters in their early-30s 
(559,000) and late-20s (535,000). The most disadvantaged group, however, will be the 
youngest voters, aged between 18 and 22: their average cohort size of (375,000) is below 
that even of people in their late-80s (388,000). 
There is little doubt that, given their higher turnout rates, the power of older cohorts in the 
democratic process over the next few decades will be formidable. In 2021, 18-year olds will 
exercise less actual voting power than 79 year-olds. 40 year-olds will exercise 83 per cent 
more power than 18 year-olds, for 45 year-olds it will be 69 per cent more, and for 50 year-
olds it will be 97 per cent more. Similarly, 55 year-olds will exercise more than double (115 
per cent) the power of 18 year-olds, 60 year-olds will exercise 95 per cent more, and 65 
year-olds will exercise 68 per cent more. In 2031, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual 
power than 84 year-olds. They will be particularly disadvantaged in comparison to, for 
example, 40 year-olds and 45 year-olds, who will exercise 73 per cent and 71 per cent more 
power respectively. 50 year-olds will exercise 55 per cent more actual power than 18 year-
olds, 65 year-olds will exercise 73 per cent more, and even 70 year-olds will exercise 51 per 
cent more. 
These trends will persist into subsequent decades. In 2041, 18 year-olds will exercise less 
actual power than 83 year-olds in the democratic process. People aged both 50 and 55 will 
exercise 84 per cent more actual power than 18 year-olds, and people aged 60 will exercise 
62 per cent more. Even voters in their early-70s will exercise significantly more power than  
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Table	  4	  Relative	  sizes	  of	  selected	  single-­year	  actual	  voter	  cohorts	  
2010 2021 2031 2041 2051 Age 
cohort % 
average 
AV cohort 
size 
% 
average 
working-
age AV 
cohort 
% 
average 
AV cohort 
size 
% 
average 
working-
age AV 
cohort 
% 
average 
AV cohort 
size 
% 
average 
working-
age AV 
cohort 
% 
average 
AV cohort 
size 
% 
average 
working-
age AV 
cohort 
% 
average 
AV cohort 
size 
% 
average 
working-
age AV 
cohort 
18 81 69 66 61 75 70 69 65 64 62 
30 105 89 73 105 92 85 101 96 98 94 
50 132 112 130 120 116 108 126 120 104 100 
65 113 96 111 102 130 120 99 95 119 114 
 Source:	  original	  calculations	  based	  on	  ONS	  population	  estimates	  AV	  =	  actual	  voter.	  Figures	  correct	  to	  nearest	  per	  cent.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  comparison	  working-­‐age	  is	  constant	  at	  18-­‐64.	  
 
18 year-olds, that is, 56 per cent. By 2051, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual power than 
a typical single-year cohort in their late-80s. 40 year-olds will exercise 83 per cent more 
power than 18 year-olds, and 50 year-olds will exercise 62 per cent more. For 60 year-olds 
the figure will be even larger, 92 per cent, and for 70 year-olds it will be 60 per cent. 
It should be noted that these results are likely to overestimate the actual voting power of the 
youngest voters, and underestimate the voting power of people in their late-60s. As such the 
democratic deficit between younger and older cohorts could be greater than reported here in 
quantitative terms. Voter turnout rates are only established in broad age groups; a typical 18 
year-old is probably less likely to vote than a typical 24 year-old, but they belong to the same 
statistical category. Similarly, everyone aged 65 or over is included in the same age group, 
yet it is probably fair to assume that people in their late-60s vote in greater numbers than 
people in, for example, their 80s and 90s. Given that we do not know likely the ‘oldest old’ 
are to vote, it is probably unfair to compare their actual voting rates with younger cohorts; yet 
equally, the inclusion of everybody aged 65 or over in a single age category means that 
comparisons between young cohorts and most older cohorts are probably unfavourably 
weighted towards the latter. 
Furthermore, the 2010 turnout rates in particular may also exaggerate the actual voting 
power of the youngest voters. While people aged 18-24 remained far less likely to vote than 
other age groups, their turnout in 2010 was 7 percentage points higher than the 2005 figure 
of 37 per cent (the 2001 figure was 39 per cent). Turnout increased across the age 
distribution in 2010, but no age group had a larger increase than 18-24; for example, the 55-
64 turnout increased by only 2 percentage points, and the 65+ turnout increased by only 1 
percentage point. It remains to be seen whether the turnout for younger voters declines, in 
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accordance with recent trends – if so, the democratic deficit will be greater than reported 
here. 
Turnout rates based on age are recorded neither precisely nor systematically by any public 
body. Given the increase in the intergenerational democratic deficit we are likely to 
experience, there is a strong case for rectifying this. 
Age-based turnout rates for local and European elections, in particular, are not recorded with 
any degree of regularity. Based on information published by the Electoral Commission, we 
know that turnout at the 2009 European parliamentary elections in the UK was 13 per cent 
for people aged 18-24, and 74 per cent for those aged 65 or over. As such, despite having a 
much smaller cohort size, people aged 65 exercised over 4 times the power that people 
aged 18 exercised. We also know that turnout in 2009 local election, in areas where 
elections were being held, was only 10 per cent for people aged 18-24, but 85 per cent for 
people aged 65 or over. This means that 65 year-olds exercised almost 7 times the power 
that people aged 18 exercised.21 
 
The influence of geography 
Using the Voter Power Index (VPI), it is possible to determine whether young people are 
more likely to be located in safe or marginal parliamentary constituencies, and in 
constituencies with low or high VPI scores.22 Interestingly, the results suggest, initially, that 
young people are more likely to be concentrated in more marginal constituencies, and 
constituencies with higher VPI scores. 
According to 2010 ONS population estimates, the fifty parliamentary constituencies in 
England and Wales with the highest concentration of people aged between 15 and 19 had 
an average VPI score of 0.362, compared to an average across all constituencies of 0.255. 
Only 38 per cent of these constituencies were classed as very safe or ultra safe, compared 
to 60 per cent across all constituencies. 42 per cent of constituencies were classed as  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  (2009)	  The	  European	  Parliamentary	  and	  Local	  Government	  Elections	  June	  2009:	  A	  
Report	  on	  the	  Administration	  of	  the	  4	  June	  2009	  Elections,	  available	  at	  
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/81483/047-­‐elections-­‐report-­‐final-­‐web.pdf.	  
Again,	  these	  figures	  are	  likely	  to	  overestimate	  the	  turnout	  of	  18	  year-­‐olds,	  and	  underestimate	  the	  turnout	  of	  
65	  year-­‐olds.	  
22	  The	  VPI	  website	  lists	  both	  the	  degree	  of	  marginality	  of	  each	  constituency,	  and	  its	  VPI	  score	  (with	  is	  based	  on	  
both	  marginality	  and	  size	  of	  constituency).	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Table	  5	  Marginality	  and	  VPI	  score	  of	  constituencies	  with	  high	  concentration	  of	  selected	  age	  groups	  
Seats with highest 
concentration of… 
VPI score % constituencies marginal 
or very marginal 
% constituencies very 
safe or ultra safe 
15-19 year-olds 0.362 42 38 
20-24 year-olds 0.298 36 42 
25-29 year-olds 0.296 30 56 
30-34 year-olds 0.282 32 60 
50-54 year-olds 0.220 18 68 
65-69 year-olds 0.354 36 48 
All seats 0.255 19 60 
 Source:	  original	  calculations	  based	  on	  ONS	  population	  estimates	  and	  VPI	  data.	  Highest	  concentration	  =	  the	  fifty	  constituencies	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  with	  highest	  proportion	  of	  given	  age	  group.	  Figures	  for	  ‘all	  seats’	  includes	  some	  constituencies	  not	  located	  in	  England	  or	  Wales.	  	  
marginal or very marginal, compared to only 19 per cent across all constituencies.23 
Generally speaking, this effect declines with age, although the trend is evident across all 
constituencies with a relatively high concentration of young people. The fifty parliamentary 
constituencies in England and Wales with the highest concentration of people aged between 
20 and 24 had an average VPI score of 0.298. 42 per cent of these constituencies were 
classed as very safe or ultra safe, and 36 per cent were classed as marginal or very 
marginal. 
The fifty parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales with the highest concentration 
of people aged between 25 and 29 had an average VPI score of 0.296. 56 per cent of these 
constituencies – close to the proportion across all constituencies – were classed as very 
safe or ultra safe, but 30 per cent – far above the proportion for all constituencies – were 
classed as marginal or very marginal. The fifty constituencies with the highest concentration 
of 30-34 year-olds had an average VPI score of 0.282. 60 per cent of these constituencies, 
the same proportion as across all constituencies, were classed as very safe or ultra safe, 
although unlike the general results, the majority of these are classed as very safe. 32 per 
cent of these constituencies are classed as marginal or very marginal. 
In contrast to the constituencies with the highest proportion of young voters, the fifty 
constituencies in England and Wales with the highest concentration of people aged between 
50 and 54 had an average VPI score of 0.220, below the average for all constituencies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Not	  all	  Scottish	  constituencies	  are	  included	  in	  the	  VPI.	  As	  such,	  only	  population	  estimates	  for	  English	  and	  
Welsh	  parliamentary	  seats	  are	  used,	  although	  references	  to	  ‘all’	  constituencies	  refers	  to	  all	  constituencies	  
included	  in	  the	  VPI.	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0.255. 68 per cent of these constituencies were classed as very safe or ultra safe, compared 
to only 60 per cent across all constituencies, although around the same proportion were 
classed as marginal or very marginal as across all constituencies. However, this trend does 
not appear to apply to across the age distribution, with constituencies with the highest 
concentration of 65-69 year olds enjoying a VPI score of 0.354, significantly above the 
average for the constituencies with the highest concentration of people aged 20-24, 25-29 or 
30-34. Moreover, only 48 per cent of these constituencies were classed as very safe or ultra 
safe, and 36 per cent as marginal or very marginal. 
More research is necessary to establish whether trends identified here can be generalised 
across the electorate. Yet it is certainly possible to say that constituencies with a high 
concentration of young people seem to hold greater sway at general elections, under the 
First Past the Post, single-member constituency electoral system (FPTP). This result 
appears to offer an important caveat to the overall findings regarding the intergenerational 
democratic deficit based on population data and turnout rates, and suggests that any move 
towards a more proportional electoral system could harm younger voters. 
However, applying turnout rates to constituency data renders the impact of the bias towards 
young people in FPTP is negligible or even non-existent in practice. Scott Davidson’s 
research demonstrates that at the 2010 general election, more than half of MPs (319 seats) 
were elected by constituency electorates within which more than half of actual voters were 
aged 55 or over.24 Furthermore, 102 MPs were elected in constituencies were more than 40 
per cent of voters were 65 or over, and 368 MPs were elected in constituencies where more 
than a third of voters were 65 or over. 
The 2010 general election accelerated trends first witnessed in 2005. In 2005, 268 MPs 
were elected in constituencies where more than half of voters were aged 55 or over, and 287 
MPs were elected in constituencies where more than a third of voters were aged 65 or over. 
Only in 45 highly urbanised constituencies did the proportion of voters aged 65 or over fall 
below a quarter. Davidson shows, furthermore, that these trends will persist and intensify in 
future elections. He projects that in 2025, 478 MPs will be elected in constituencies where 
more than half of voters are aged 55 or over, and 179 MPs elected in constituencies where 
more than 60 per cent of voters are in this age group.25 294 MPs will be elected in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Davidson,	  Scott	  (2009)	  Quantifying	  the	  Changing	  Age	  Structure	  of	  the	  British	  Electorate	  2005-­‐2025:	  
Researching	  the	  Age	  Demographics	  of	  the	  New	  Parliamentary	  Constituencies	  (Age	  UK).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  
Davidson’s	  research,	  although	  based	  on	  2010	  constituency	  boundaries,	  uses	  2005	  turnout	  rates.	  We	  now	  know	  
that	  turnout	  rates	  increased	  across	  all	  age	  groups	  by	  2010,	  especially	  among	  young	  people,	  so	  Davidson’s	  
results	  slightly	  exaggerate	  the	  power	  of	  ‘the	  grey	  vote’.	  
25	  The	  ONS	  does	  not	  publish	  projections	  of	  constituency	  populations;	  Davidson	  translated	  local	  authority-­‐based	  
projections	  to	  assess	  2025	  parliamentary	  constituencies.	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constituencies where more than 40 per cent of voters are aged 55 or over, and 466 MPs will 
be elected in constituencies where more than a third of voters are aged 55 or over. 
Davidson’s research was commissioned by Age UK, who subsequently proclaimed ‘electoral 
power is firmly in the hands of older voters’.26 
The influence of geography on the intergenerational democratic deficit is not clear-cut. 
Firstly, although young people seem to be concentrated in constituencies with greater 
marginality and higher VPI scores, compared to all constituencies and constituencies with 
the highest concentration of 50-54 year-olds, Davidson’s research demonstrates decisively 
that young people’s low turnout at elections means that this potential power is being 
squandered. Furthermore, if young people did vote in greater numbers, it could in fact alter 
the marginality and VPI scores of the constituencies in which they are concentrated; indeed, 
research on the 2001 general election has demonstrated a statistically significant 
relationship between low turnout and the proportion of young people in a constituency.27 
Secondly, constituencies with the highest concentration of 65 year-olds were even more 
likely to be more marginal, and had a higher average VPI score, than most ‘younger seats’. 
This result therefore intensifies the pensioner power identified by Davidson. 
Thirdly, even if FPTP theoretically favours younger voters, intergenerational fairness surely 
dictates that the electoral system should favour no particular age-group. Furthermore, we 
should not necessarily expect this bias to persist into future elections: Davidson did not 
utilise the VPI, but did include marginality in his analysis, and suggested that the 
concentration of young people in the most marginal constituencies will decline over the next 
15 years as ‘the grey vote’ becomes more geographically dispersed.  And finally, while the 
results for the impact of geography noted here are interesting, and worthy of further 
exploration, initial analysis suggests that most parliamentary seats in England and Wales 
contain a spread of age groups broadly consistent with the population in general – few seats 
have exceptionally high concentrations of any age group. Having said this, it is worth noting 
that not a single constituency in the ‘top fifty’ lists for the concentration of young people 
features in the top fifty list for people aged 50-54 or 65-69, therefore indicating a degree of 
age apartheid within the FPTP system – there is certainly an urban/rural dimension to this 
divide, with young people concentrate in more urban seats. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Age	  UK	  (2010)	  ‘Electoral	  power	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  older	  voters’,	  available	  at	  www.ageuk.org.uk/latest-­‐
press/archive/new-­‐research-­‐shows-­‐that-­‐electoral-­‐power-­‐lies-­‐firmly-­‐in-­‐the-­‐hands-­‐of-­‐older-­‐voters/.	  	  
27	  Whitely,	  Paul	  (2001)	  ‘Turnout’	  in	  Norris,	  Philip	  (ed.)	  Britain	  Votes	  2001	  (Oxford	  University	  Press).	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The democratic process 
Understanding the formal power possessed or exercised by young people in the electoral 
system is vital, but understanding the intergenerational democratic deficit requires also 
attention to young people’s relationship with the actual process of democracy more 
generally. Unless these challenges are addressed now, today’s young people may become 
a permanently disenfranchised generation, disengaged from the democratic process even as 
they get older. Certain features of the democratic process may of course help to explain why 
young people are less likely to vote. However, just as important for our purposes is the 
possibility that the democratic process serves to disenfranchise young people even if they do 
vote. 
 
Voting methods 
There is evidence that young people are less supportive of traditional methods of voting than 
older cohorts. Electoral Commission research in 2002 found that people aged 18-24 were 
significantly more likely to support telephone voting, internet voting, 24-hour polling stations 
and voting at the weekend than people aged 25 or over. However, given that only a small 
minority in both age groups supported these measures, the impact of voting methods on the 
democratic deficit should not be exaggerated.28 Similar findings emerged from the 2003 
Nestlé Family Monitor, which surveyed around 1000 people aged between 11 and 18. 37 per 
cent of those surveyed stated that voting in person was their preferred method of voting 
(although this would not discount the possibility of weekend or 24-hour voting), but 36 per 
cent said that SMS or internet voting would be their preferred method. 10 per cent preferred 
postal voting. Of those eligible to vote at the following general election (2005), 42 per cent 
preferred voting in person, and 35 per cent preferred SMS or internet voting.29  
It is normal to expect support for traditional methods to grow as people age, and become 
more familiar with these methods. Yet this does not mean that other methods should not be 
explored – particular given that our main concern should be first-time voters who, by 
definition, will always be unfamiliar with traditional methods and therefore permanently 
disenfranchised to some extent. Certainly, further research on this issue would be justified 
on this basis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Electoral	  Commission	  (2002)	  Voter	  Engagement	  and	  Young	  People,	  available	  at	  
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0019/16093/youngpplvoting
_6597-­‐6188__E__N__S__W__.pdf.	  	  
29	  Nestlé	  Family	  Monitor	  (2003)	  Young	  People’s	  Attitudes	  Towards	  Politics,	  available	  at	  
moriireland.com/Assets/Docs/Archive/Polls/nfm16.pdf.	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Voter registration 
Voter registration has an even more significant impact on young people. 2011 research into 
Britain’s electoral registers by the Electoral Commission discovered some alarming results 
regarding the variability of voter registration by age, as figure 6 demonstrates. Whereas 
people aged 65 or above (94 per cent) or between 55 and 64 (90 per cent) have very high 
levels of registration among eligible voters, only 55 per cent of people aged 17 or 18, and 56 
per cent of people aged between 19 and 24, are registered to vote. The figure for people 
aged 25-34 is 72 per cent.30 Age-based differences are far more pronounced that class-
based or ethnicity-based differences. 
Registration rates are an important dimension to the findings on the potential electorate 
presented above. Registration rates have no impact on results on the actual voting power of 
young people – because turnout rates are based on surveys of both registered and non-
registered voters – but nevertheless provide further evidence of the misleading nature of 
using data on the potential electorate alone to gauge the intergenerational democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Electoral	  Commission	  (2011)	  Great	  Britain’s	  Electoral	  Registers	  2011,	  available	  at	  
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/145366/Great-­‐Britains-­‐electoral-­‐registers-­‐
2011.pdf.	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deficit. The median potential voter in 2010 was aged 46. Information on 2011 registration 
rates suggests that the median registered voter was aged 49 at the 2010 general election, 
three years older than the median potential voter.31 As figure 7 indicates, there were only 
444,000 18 year-olds registered to vote. This is fewer than any other single age until 74. 
Analysing the impact of registration rates does not significantly reduce the potential voting 
power of 40-somethings at the 2010 general election, but it does allow other age-groups, 
notably people in their early-60s, to catch up to some extent. People aged between 60 and 
64 had an average registered voter single-year cohort size of 678,000, compared to an 
average of 554,000 for the registered electorate overall. The youngest voters, aged between 
18 and 22, had an average cohort size of only 467,000. 
Clearly, non-registered voters are concentrated among young people. One of the most 
worrying aspects of the Electoral Commission’s research on registration was 44 per cent of 
people not on the electoral register do not realise they are not registered. This is indicative of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  figures	  for	  ‘potential’	  voters	  include	  all	  individuals,	  not	  only	  those	  eligible	  to	  vote,	  
but	  registration	  rates	  are	  based	  on	  eligible	  voters.	  However,	  given	  that	  virtually	  all	  individuals	  aged	  18	  or	  over	  
are	  eligible	  to	  vote,	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  analysis	  here	  is	  negligible.	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one of main explanations for non-registration: moving home. People tend not to realise they 
need to re-register when they move. Only 26 per cent of eligible voters who have lived in 
their current residence for less than one year are registered to vote. This rise to 76 per cent 
for residency of 1-2 years, but even this remains significantly below the figure for residency 
of over 5 years, that is, 91 per cent. Similarly, type of tenure has a significant impact on voter 
registration. Only 56 per cent of eligible voters renting from a private landlord are registered 
to vote, compared to 78 per cent of social housing tenants, 87 per cent of people living in 
their own home with a mortgage, and 89 per cent of people who own their own home 
outright. Young people are more likely to move residence frequently, and more likely to be 
private tenants rather than owner-occupiers – it therefore appears that existing methods of 
registering voters discriminate against young people. 
The problem of non-registration may in fact undermine the apparent bias of the FPTP 
electoral system in favour of young people. We can speculate that the kind of young people 
living in the highly urbanised constituencies with a high concentration of young people are 
also those in private rented accommodation who move home fairly frequently. Certainly, 
further research on this possible correlation is urgently required. Furthermore, non-
registration among young people problematises the boundary changes planned in advance 
of the next general election, given that calculations of constituency size are based on 
registered voters.32 Young people may lose altogether the bias in potential voting power 
afforded to them by FPTP.  
It would be easy to dismiss non-registration, like non-voting, as a ‘choice’ made by young 
people. However, non-registration is certainly less of a conscious choice than non-voting, 
given that moving home means that some people may miss the relevant canvass, and that 
registration usually takes place long before the electoral process begins to receive significant 
media attention, which may act as a prompt. Moreover, the fact that many young people are 
not registered to vote clearly undermines, to some extent, the notion that even non-voting is 
a choice – principally because non-registration means they are unable to vote, but also 
because a failure to register means they do not receive a formal prompt in the form of a 
polling card. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Wintour,	  Patrick	  &	  Syal,	  Rajeev	  (2011)	  ‘Six	  million	  voters	  not	  registered,	  says	  Electoral	  Commission’,	  The	  
Guardian,	  14	  December	  2011,	  available	  at	  www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/dec/14/six-­‐million-­‐voters-­‐
unregistered.	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Political participation 
The formal procedures of the democratic process seem to discriminate against young people 
unduly. However, academic research suggests in addition that the nature of participating in 
elections conflicts with the way that young people envisage meaningful political action, 
precisely because it is not participatory enough. A study by Matt Henn and Nick Foard 
suggests in fact that young people are highly politicised, but perceive more informal forms of 
political participation, such as protesting and organising campaigns exogenous to the party 
system, as more influential and worthwhile than the electoral process.33 Unseating an 
incumbent government is seen as less relevant, to many young people, than targeting more 
directly particular organisations and practices deemed to be a threat to or inconsistent with 
their values. Of course, this does not mean that today’s young people are right in this regard. 
This paper is not the place to adjudicate on the most impactful forms of political participation; 
it suffices to assert the premise that voting does matter in the British political system, and 
that young people are not benefiting from democratic life if they are not exercising voting 
power at elections.  
It is worth noting, however, that Henn and Foard find that young people are supportive of the 
notion of elections. 61 per cent of 18 year-olds agreed that voting in a general election is an 
effective way of influencing the government – a far higher proportion than actually voted in 
2010. Remarkably, 53 per cent agreed that voting in a local election was an effective form of 
influence too. This seems to correlate with research by Janine Dermody, Stuart Hanmer-
Lloyd and Richard Scullion. Addressing the notion that today’s young people are apathetic 
about politics, they undertook qualitative interviews with over 1,000 potential first-time voters 
after the 2005 general election. They discovered that young people are certainly cynical 
about politics, but not uninterested in the electoral process. In fact, the researchers 
discovered a ‘monitorial’ interaction between young people and voting, with many having 
followed the election but made a decision, more or less consciously, to abstain.34 
Related to this is the fact that today’s young people do not feel a duty to vote. In their 
analysis of the 2009/10 British Election Survey, Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel find that, 
while around 80 per cent of older people said they would feel guilty if they did not vote, just 
over half of young people shared this view (which, again, is a greater proportion than 
actually voted in 2010).35 Various studies reinforce this finding.36 While many young people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Henn,	  Matt	  &	  Foard,	  Nick	  (2012)	  ‘Young	  people,	  political	  participation	  and	  trust	  in	  Britain’	  in	  Parliamentary	  
Affairs	  65(1),	  pp.	  47-­‐67.	  
34	  Dermody,	  Janine	  et	  al	  (2010)	  ‘Young	  people	  and	  voting	  behaviour:	  alienated	  youth	  and	  (or)	  an	  interested	  
and	  critical	  citizenry’	  in	  European	  Journal	  of	  Marketing	  44(3/4),	  pp.	  421-­‐35.	  
35	  Furlong,	  Andy	  &	  Cartmel,	  Fred	  (2012)	  ‘Social	  change	  and	  political	  engagement	  among	  young	  people:	  
generation	  and	  the	  2009/10	  British	  Election	  Survey’	  in	  Parliamentary	  Affairs	  65(1),	  pp.	  13-­‐28.	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feel strongly about the need to act politically in support of their values, this is not associated 
solely or even predominantly with voting. While this may be regrettable, it is also grounds for 
considering the formal procedures of the democratic process, if the intergenerational 
democratic deficit is to be overcome. 
 
Alienation or apathy? 
This hints at one of the recurring themes of the academic literature on young people and 
politics: that young people are alienated from politics, but not apathetic.37 In his book Why 
We Hate Politics, Colin Hay argues persuasively that too much attention has been given to 
the demand for politics, and not enough to the supply of politics. In terms of young people, 
we need to consider not merely the fact that young people are less engaged with formal 
politics, but what it is about formal politics that discourages full participation.38 
It is worth considering the study by Henn and Foard, who make the point that young people 
may in fact be more politically active than older cohorts, despite low turnout rates, in more 
detail here. Henn and Foard surveyed 1,025 18 year-olds in 2011.39 63 per cent claimed to 
be interested in politics, and only 13 per cent said they were not. But a sense of hesitancy, 
powerlessness and mistrust pervades 18 year-olds’ perspective on politics. 46 per cent said 
they did not know enough about politics to participate in elections, and 50 per cent said they 
did not understand enough. 1 in 4 respondents had actually undertaken a GCSE in 
Citizenship Studies, but 63 per cent of these said that this education had little or no impact 
on their knowledge or understanding of politics. 
In terms of powerlessness, over half of 18 year-olds agreed that ‘young people like me have 
no say in what the government does’ (with 14 per cent disagreeing), and 61 per cent 
agreeing that they had little or no influence on decisions made on their behalf by 
governments (with 6 per cent disagreeing). 61 per cent believe there are not enough 
opportunities for them to influence political parties (with 7 per cent disagreeing). Only a third 
believe that voting helps to change the way the UK is governed – 29 per cent were more 
positive about the impact of voting, but the large number of ‘don’t know’ answers indicates 
again a lack of understanding of the electoral process. In terms of mistrust, over half of 18 
year-olds believe that governments treat young people unfairly (with 15 per cent 
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disagreeing), and two-thirds believe that governments tend to be untrustworthy (with 15 per 
cent disagreeing). 
As discussed above, we must recall that many young people are intimately engaged in 
political activity, albeit rarely mainstream, conventional politics focused on elections and 
political parties. This has led to concerns of a divide among young people between the 
politically active and inactive, with the former more likely to be university-educated, and 
therefore generally more affluent. This class divide certainly matters: research on youth 
politics in the United States has associated low levels of engagement with formal politics 
with the protracted transition to adulthood now experienced by most young people, meaning 
that they many are excluded from forms of early political socialisation associated with the 
workplace and engagement with local community activities. Crucially, young people in higher 
education experience an alternative form of political socialisation, while those not attending 
college now miss out entirely.40 However, it would be wrong to infer a significant difference in 
attitude between activists and non-activists in any simplistic sense. James Sloan’s research, 
which used an in-depth qualitative study to compare activists and non-activists aged 
between 18 and 24, found similar attitudes to politics across the two groups. The activists 
were very different social animals in terms of their engagement and appreciation of civil 
society. They were far more likely to vote, but also explicit in their opinion that more informal 
forms of political participation are more effective in bringing about change. However, the 
non-activists were not opposed in principle, or uninterested in, such activities. Crucially, 
activists and non-activists shared a frustration with what they perceive as politics, that is, 
elections and parties. Non-activists were actually reluctant to describe their activities as 
political, for fear of association with the formal political realm.41 
It is on the basis of this kind of evidence that Rys Farthing describes today’s young people 
as ‘radically unpolitical’. Young people are indeed averse to politics – especially so if even 
young activists are reluctant to describe their activities as political – but this in-itself is a 
political position. They refuse to endorse what they see as the political realm, but in this 
disavowal lies a political consciousness in search of expression.42 If we are concerned about 
the intergenerational democratic deficit, it is not enough to implore young people themselves 
to alter their behaviour or attitudes – because these are bound up, as with all generations, 
with their experience of social and economic life more generally. The practice of democracy 
must evolve too. Although this paper is primarily interested in the exercise of power through 
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formal democratic processes, it is necessary also to find ways to involve more young people 
in the kind of informal political activities to which they appear more suited, and to empower 
this form of political participation. This is a vital task, but ultimately, what matters in a 
representative democracy is voting, parties and legislatures – we must not allow the notion 
that young people prefer to voice their opinion by non-traditional or more oppositional means 
to undermine efforts include young people in the formal democratic process. 
 
Political parties 
As alluded to above, one of the main supply-side issues related to young people’s alienation 
from the democratic process is the nature and role of political parties. As the main ‘agents’ of 
democracy it is vital that the parties reflect the perspectives of young people in order to 
alleviate the intergenerational democratic deficit. The most obvious starting point is the age 
profile of party memberships. We know that in 2010 the median potential voter was aged 46. 
According to a large-scale internet survey of 18,706 voters (including 1,230 political party 
members) undertaken by Paul Whiteley – the UK’s leading authority on party membership – 
in 2008, the average (mean) age of a party member in the UK is 49.4, compared to an 
average age of non-members of 44.6. This includes an average age for Labour Party 
members of 47.4 and for Liberal Democrats of 48.5, both significantly above the average 
age for non-members. The oldest party, however, is the Conservative Party, with an average 
age of 51.9.43 
Moreover, this estimation of the Conservative Party’s average age, and therefore the overall 
average age of party members, may be an underestimation. A study of the Conservative 
Party by Tim Bale published in 2011 reported that the party’s average age was 55, with two-
thirds of members above this age.44 The Conservative Campaign for Democracy estimated 
in 2010 the party’s average age as 68, having risen from 64 in 2005.45 A 2011 poll of 
Conservative Party members, conducted by telephone and online and funded by Michael 
Ashcroft, reported that more than 60 per cent of respondents were aged 65 or over.46 
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Table	  8	  Attitudes	  of	  18	  year-­olds	  towards	  political	  parties 
 % agree % disagree 
I am likely in the future to give money to any of the political parties 6 76 
I would in the future be prepared to work for a political party 8 70 
I would consider in the future convincing someone else how to vote 22 50 
Political parties do a good job of finding suitable people to run for 
parliament 
22 29 
Political parties do a good job of listening to people’s concerns and 
responding to them positively 
12 51 
Political parties are effective organisations for changing the lives of 
people for the better 
21 31 
There is often a big difference between what a party promises it will do 
and what it does when it wins an election 
75 3 
Political parties are more interested in winning elections than in 
governing afterwards 
65 9 
Political parties do more to divide the country than unite it 47 12 
In elections, political parties don’t tell people about the really important 
problems facing the country 
48 16 
Political parties aren’t interested in the same issues that concern young 
people 
64 7 
The main political parties do not offer voters real choice in elections 
because their policies are pretty much all the same 
40 18 
	  Source:	  adapted	  from	  Henn	  &	  Foard	  (2012)	  –	  see	  note	  30 
 
Young people’s attitudes towards political parties reflect their attitudes to politics in general. 
Henn and Foard’s 2011 study of 18 year-olds, cited above, contains information relevant to 
this issue – presented in full in table 8. Arguing that, despite generally supporting the 
electoral process, ‘today’s generation of young people cannot bring themselves to actually 
support the main political parties in practice’, Henn and Foard show that 57 per cent of the 
youngest voters have little or no trust in political parties, with only 8 per cent reporting some 
or a great deal of trust. Their results profile a generation of citizens frustrated by political 
parties, and unwilling to contemplate significant engagement with parties in the future.47 As 
Eldin Fahmy argues, young people do not see political parties as vehicles for participatory 
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politics, but rather as part of the traditional political system geared around electoral 
campaigning and adversarial politics.48 
In their analysis of ‘the party politics of youth citizenship’, Andrew Mycock and Jonathan 
Tonge argue that in seeking to address the political disaffection of young people, the main 
political parties have concentrated on civil rather than civic engagement. In other words, they 
perceive young people as ‘not-yet-citizens’ and entreat them to adopt the norms of ‘good’ 
citizenship, rather than promoting the rights of young people as members of a democratic 
society to have an impact on how they are governed. Therefore 
[t]he programmes of youth engagement initiated by the Labour and Coalition 
governments… have not however sought to empower or emancipate young people 
politically or socially. The stress on responsibility and duty underlines the replicative 
underpinnings of how citizenship is understood by the Coalition government, with young 
people expected to limit their claims to social rights enjoyed by previous generations and 
to fill in emergent gaps in public welfare provision left behind by a rapidly withdrawing 
state... The failure to acknowledge the limitations of the existing party-based political 
system, both in its limited appeal to young people and its exclusory internal structures, 
has resulted in the adoption of youth citizenship agendas whereby culpability is 
misguidedly youth centric. This lack of introspection of political parties will continue to 
undermine youth initiatives to encourage political participation.49 
The reference here to the lack of introspection, and neglect of internal structures, indicates 
the charge that the youth sections of the main political parties are at least partly culpable in 
the alienation of young people from formal politics. Mycock and Tonge argue that, through 
fear of embarrassment, the main parties have sought to prevent the empowerment of their 
youth sections – they are organisationally subservient, and used principally to train future 
elites or to generate positive publicity for the party leadership. 
The youth sections are therefore worth examining in more depth. The general trends, across 
all main parties, is for youth sections to be relatively powerless within the main party 
structures, under-resourced, and dominated by university students. Unlike the Labour 
Party’s youth sections, Conservative Future and Liberal Youth have the creditable distinction 
of being internally democratic. Yet these organisations do not provide a formal platform for 
young members to influence the party, and the party leaderships offer few resources to 
support the youth sections in this regard. Both Conservative Future and Liberal Youth are, in 
fact, amalgamations of their respective party’s youth and student wings, and therefore 
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formally establish the domination of students over non-student members through the 
organisational and financial advantages of the affiliation of university branches to students’ 
unions.50 
The Labour Party’s youth sections are far more complicated, given the divide between 
Labour Students and Young Labour (although student members aged under 27 
automatically become Young Labour members too). Crucially, Labour does seek to provide 
a platform for young members to formally influence party policy – although the current 
structure is palpably failing to achieve this objective. Young Labour is led in theory by the 
National Executive Committee Youth Representative. Young members therefore have a seat 
on the party’s ruling body. However, unlike the other main parties, this leadership position is 
elected only at the annual Young Labour conference, which is very poorly attended, rather 
than by a ballot of young members in general. Furthermore, it is an unpaid post – the 
incumbent does not even receive expenses remittance. With three full-time, salaried 
National Officers, financed by the party leadership (and supported by students’ unions), 
Labour Students receives virtually all of the financial resources available to the Labour 
Party’s youth sections. And despite being elected only by student members, these National 
Officers are automatic members of Young Labour’s executive committee. There are also 
youth representatives on the party’s National Policy Forum but, perhaps most absurdly, 
these positions are selected not by young members themselves but by a plenary session of 
Labour’s annual conference.51 
It seems likely that political parties exacerbate the intergenerational democratic deficit. Even 
if today’s young people had the opportunity and inclination to engage significantly with 
formal democratic processes, the nature of parties and the party system means that they 
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  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
young	  people	  in	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  despite	  having	  chosen	  to	  join	  a	  political	  party	  (which,	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  the	  
governing	  party)	  do	  not	  differ	  radically	  in	  their	  opinions	  about	  politics	  to	  young	  people	  in	  general.	  Most	  young	  
members	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  research,	  including	  highly	  active	  members.	  were	  strongly	  critical	  of	  the	  
Labour	  Party’s	  approach	  to	  young	  people	  and	  as	  such	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  party’s	  youth	  sections.	  See	  
Bruter,	  Michael	  &	  Harrison,	  Sarah	  (2009)	  ‘Tomorrow’s	  leaders?	  Understanding	  the	  involvement	  of	  young	  party	  
members	  in	  six	  European	  democracies’	  in	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  42(10),	  pp.	  1259-­‐91	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  
the	  rise	  of	  ‘professionally-­‐minded’	  young	  members	  in	  political	  parties	  across	  political	  spectrums	  in	  several	  
countries	  in	  Europe,	  including	  the	  UK.	  While	  forming	  the	  minority	  of	  young	  members,	  these	  career-­‐focused	  
and	  politically	  astute	  young	  activists	  tend	  to	  fill	  the	  leadership	  positions	  within	  youth	  sections	  before	  becoming	  
representatives	  or	  employees	  of	  the	  party	  later	  in	  their	  career,	  and	  act	  mainly	  to	  serve	  the	  main	  party	  
leadership	  rather	  than	  represent	  young	  members	  in	  general.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  attitudinal	  divide	  among	  
young	  people	  is	  neither	  between	  activists	  and	  non-­‐activists	  nor	  even	  party	  members	  and	  non-­‐party	  members,	  
but	  rather	  between	  those	  opposed	  to	  how	  the	  democratic	  process	  operates,	  and	  those	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  
status	  quo	  in	  return	  for	  a	  future	  career	  in	  politics.	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have little influence in the process of selecting prospective candidates for election, nor in 
shaping the policies that will be put to electorates and ultimately enacted in government. 
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3. Solutions? 
The previous section established the existence of an intergenerational democratic deficit – 
evident today, but highly likely to intensify in coming decades. The ageing of the potential 
electorate will move democracy away from its traditional demographic foundations, and 
exposes the persistent trait in the UK’s system of representative democracy to treat young 
people as not-yet-citizens. When factors such as voter registration, the actual exercise of 
power by different age cohorts, and features of the democratic process such as the party 
system, are considered, the democratic status of even today’s young people appears highly 
disadvantaged. 
We should be worried therefore about ‘generation D’, tomorrow’s young people whose 
relative disenfranchisement seems almost inevitable. But we should worry no less about 
‘generation Y’, today’s young people who are experiencing now the rebalancing of the 
democratic process in favour of older cohorts. The continuing legitimacy of representative 
democracy may be at stake. This section therefore considers ways in which the electoral 
process and wider features of contemporary may be reformed to re-balance political power 
back towards those most likely to be affected by decisions made by democratic institutions. 
Potential ‘solutions’ are grouped into six categories representing aspects of democratic life in 
the UK:  
• the electorate 
• the voting process 
• encouraging participation 
• democratic institutions 
• wider reforms to governance procedures 
• protecting future generations 
It is argued here that change is required across every category if the intergenerational 
democratic deficit is to be overcome, but potential changes within each category range from 
relatively conservative, piecemeal interventions to radical transformations in democratic 
practice. 
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Fig	  9	  Range	  of	  possible	  changes	  to	  democratic	  system	  
 
The electorate 
Lowering the voting age to 16 
The argument for lowering the voting age in the UK to 16 is usually made, understandably, 
on the basis of the human rights of people aged 16 and 17. We think it is generally correct 
that children cannot vote, so the voting age question is really one of where childhood ends 
and adulthood begins. Answers to this question will always, to some extent, be somewhat 
arbitrary. However, given the kind of entitlements and obligations now upheld by 16 year-
olds in the UK, it is not credible that they do not also possess the right to vote. Most 
obviously, a society that has decided not to protect 16 year-olds from military service cannot 
deny this age group the vote and still satisfy in full the criteria of democracy. 
The second most common justification for lowering the voting age is that it would send a 
powerful message to all young people that their contribution to the political system is 
	  	  
	  
46	  
 
 
welcomed, even required.52 16 and 17 year-olds would be invited into the potential 
electorate, but the change could encourage more young people in general to join the actual 
electorate. 
Both arguments are highly persuasive. However, for the purposes of this paper, the most 
important consideration is the impact that lowering the voting age might have on the 
intergenerational democratic deficit. What would be the impact on the balance between age 
cohorts in the electorate as a whole? In 2010, the cohorts aged 16 and 17 were small 
(758,000 and 774,000 respectively). The impact on the voting power of 40-somethings would 
have been minimal. If we assume that 16 and 17 year-olds would have voted at the same 
rate as people aged 18 (remembering that the turnout rate for 18 year-olds is likely to be an 
exaggeration), the impact on the actual voting power of people in their late-40s, and older 
cohorts more generally, would have been negligible. The median potential voter would have 
been 45 rather than 46. The presumed unwillingness of 16 and 17 year-olds to actually vote 
means that the median actual voter would have remained age 49. 
This limited impact is also evident in terms of future electorates. In 2031, the median 
potential voter would, again, be one year younger at 48. The median actual would, again, be 
the same age at 52. The pattern largely persists into the 2051 electorate: the median 
potential voter would be 50, rather than 51, but the median actual voter would also be a year 
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younger, that this, 53 rather than 54. This is not to suggest that the voting age should not be 
lowered to 16, both on the basis of human rights and because it may in practice encourage 
higher rates of actual voting. However, the fact that the impact on the overall 
intergenerational democratic deficit would be limited or even negligible, may help to explain 
why campaign for votes at 16 enjoys such significant support among existing political elites, 
albeit seemingly not at the centre of government. 
 
Votes for parents 
The electorate could also be increased by offering additional votes to parents. As noted 
above, it is considered legitimate within all democratic systems to restrict children from 
voting. However, they – and their futures – will inevitably be affected by the outcomes of the 
democratic process. Furthermore, it is likely that votes cast on behalf of the youngest 
members of society will be broadly in tune with the votes of the youngest adults in society; 
this measure could therefore alleviate the democratic deficit faced by young people, as well 
as serve the interests of future voters. While not currently established in any political system, 
the ruling party in Hungary, Fidesz, proposed votes for parents in 2011 – and the law is 
expected to pass given the party’s significant majority in the legislature.53 
There are, however, several difficulties with the notion of votes for parents. Would parents 
have an additional vote for each child? In Hungary, parents are only permitted one additional 
vote, irrespective of the number of offspring. What if parents are divided in their political 
preferences (that is, in theory, divided in their perception of their children’s best interests)? 
Under the Demeny system, developed by American demographer Paul Demeny in the 
1980s, each parent would have half a vote, enabling their child’s vote to be split. The 
Hungary proposal, on the other hand, would grant parental votes only to mothers. Both the 
Hungarian and Demeny system – leaving aside the caveats – offer a full vote to the parents 
of a child. But it may be fairer, from some perspectives, to offer less than a full vote to 
children. Clearly, answers to these questions will always be arbitrary, and governed perhaps 
by practicalities rather than principle. 
Perhaps the most serious objections relate to the nature of representation rather than 
logistical issues. Can parents really be expected to vote on behalf of their children’s 
interests? If so, it begs the question of why the system would be needed in the first place. 
Most members of older age cohorts within the electorate are parents (or grandparents); 
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indeed, most members of younger cohorts are future parents. If individuals are deemed 
capable of voting on behalf of future citizens, can we not simply expect them to take into 
account the interests of future citizens in deciding upon their own preferences? A related 
problem is that votes for parents may be discriminatory against individuals who choose not 
to have children, or are unable to have children. Should these circumstances mean their 
vote is worth less? If there were a way to guarantee that parental votes were genuinely cast 
based on the child’s interests, it would of course be unfair to say that the votes of non-
parents are worth less; in practice, such guarantees are illusory. 
 
Age balance within constituencies 
In practical terms, ensuring that each parliamentary constituency has an age distribution 
(roughly) proportionate to the electorate in general would be a significant transformation of 
the existing electoral system (especially if also introduced for local authorities). Yet in terms 
of the principle of one person, one vote this change would probably be less disruptive than 
parental votes. While this system would not significantly assist in overcoming the 
intergenerational democratic deficit as experienced by young people – as it would simply 
reflect the ageing population – it would reinforce the case that an age-blind democratic 
process is illusory. 
We know that there is minimal overlap between the constituencies with a high concentration 
of young voters, and those with a high concentration of older voters. It may be highly 
challenging logistically, therefore, to achieve a proportionate age distribution in all or even 
most parliamentary seats – especially given the urban/rural dimension to this trend. The 
most radical remedy to this dilemma would be to adopt larger, multi-member constituencies. 
By covering wider geographical areas, it is more likely that constituencies can be designed 
to enable a proportionate age distribution, but a significantly smaller number of parliamentary 
constituencies would necessitate more than one representative serving each area (as for the 
European Parliament). A more conservative approach would simply be to mandate the 
Electoral Commission to take into account the desirability of – or even prioritise – a 
proportionate age distribution when reviewing constituency boundaries.  
 
The voting process 
Easier voting methods 
The second section of this paper discussed the possibility that traditional methods of voting 
discouraged young people from voting. It is not clear that traditional voting methods are a 
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significant barrier to voting for young people, and therefore do not constitute a substantive 
aspect of the intergenerational democratic deficit. However, it is also clear that at least some 
young people would prefer to cast their vote by less conventional methods: over the internet, 
by SMS, at the weekend, at 24-hour polling stations, etc. Furthermore, even small increases 
in turnout rates for young people would result in substantial increases in actual voting power, 
and therefore the representativeness of governments actually elected within the UK political 
system. At the level of principle therefore there are few, if any, justifications for not 
experimenting with ‘easier’ methods of voting. 
 
Individual voter registration 
One of the main reasons that young people are registered to vote is that they tend to move 
home more frequently than other age groups. Ostensibly therefore the planned move to 
individual voter registration, to be introduced before the next general election, should enable 
the disassociation of voter registration from residence. However, the current plans do not 
achieve this objective: residence will still matter, perhaps even more so than under the 
current system. The planned system is designed to move away from collective voter 
registration, within households, which is deemed archaic and vulnerable to fraud. Yet even 
with voters now registering as individuals, residence will still be a vital factor in identifying 
and verifying eligible voters – to break the link to residence would mean the new system 
would be similarly vulnerable to fraud.54 
The House of Commons’ Political and Constitutional Reform select committee has reported 
therefore that the move to individual voter registration is even more likely to disenfranchise 
young people.55 Overall, as many as 10 million people are expected to disappear from the 
electoral register – which will then form the basis of further boundary changes after the 2015 
general election. Electoral experts have warned that, as well as young people, those 
becoming non-registered voters are likely to be concentrated among those already less likely 
to be registered to vote: ethnic minority groups, people on low-incomes, and Labour 
supporters. The apparent tendency of FPTP to favour young people – which is of course 
already undermined by low registration rates in urban areas – could also be wiped out by the 
plans: the chairman of the UK’s Electoral Registration Officers, John Stewart, has said that 
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non-registration rates will increase far more in inner-city areas than ‘the leafy shires’ where 
older voters tend to be concentrated.56 
Clearly, individual voter registration is the only long-term future for electoral registration; the 
UK (or, more precisely, Great Britain, as Northern Ireland has already implemented the 
change) is the only major Western democracy that retains collective, household-based 
registration methods. However, in order to empower rather than further disenfranchise young 
people, a way of enabling voting to stay on the electoral register even if they move home (or 
at least make it easier to inform the relevant authorities if they move home after the final 
canvass before an election) must be found. 
 
Mandatory voting 
Changes to the electorate, discussed above, would be largely superfluous in terms of the 
intergenerational democratic deficit (albeit not human rights) if the turnout rates of young 
people were to significantly increase. Mandatory or compulsory voting may be the most 
effective way of achieving this. However, the prospect is undermined by several problems 
both in principle and in practice. 
The most appropriate example of a political system with mandatory voting is Australia. Non-
voting in Australia is a criminal act, penalised with a small fine, and potentially community or 
custodial sentences in the event of non-payment. However, voting is only compulsory for 
registered voters, and while registration is in theory also compulsory, non-registration is not 
in practice criminalised. Herein lies the difficulty in terms of overcoming the intergenerational 
democratic deficit: according to 2005 research, around 1 in 5 Australians aged between 18 
and 25 are not on the electoral register, compared to around 1 in 25 of all eligible voters.57 
In the Australian system, there is no abstention option on the ballot paper. Failing to vote for 
one of the actual candidates or parties standing for election is illegal, although of course 
many voters take advantage of secret ballots to submit invalid ballot papers. In terms of 
addressing the democratic deficit experienced by young people, it does not seem credible to 
forbid abstention – taking young voters seriously means listening to their protests against the 
existing political system.58 Of course, even with an abstention option on the ballot paper, 
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mandatory voting compels young people (or any voter) to participate in an electoral process 
that they may not support; a formally registered abstention could be interpreted as simply 
‘undecided’ and therefore perceived as a form of support for the system in general, if not any 
particular candidate. The most important objective, surely, is to ensure that young people’s 
perspectives are heard within the democratic process. This will probably be achieved by 
higher turnout rates – but perhaps only superficially, if higher turnout is itself achieved 
through compulsion.59 Furthermore, even higher turnout rates will become increasingly 
ineffective as the potential electorate continues to age in coming decades. 
 
Encouraging participation 
Citizenship education 
The second section noted Matt Henn and Nick Foard’s finding that most students that have 
undertaken citizenship education at secondary school claim that it has not improved their 
understanding of politics. Rys Farthing argues that citizenship education is an adult-centric 
approach to solving the problem of young people’s disaffection with politics, adding that 
political elites should focus on the supply of rather than demand for politics.60 
However, more detailed research produces a more equivocal conclusion. Ben Kisby and 
James Sloam’s study of citizenship education in the UK finds that, while there is significant 
room for improvement in the teaching of citizenship in secondary schools, in general its 
introduction has improved political knowledge and efficacy among students.61 Jonathan 
Tonge, Andrew Mycock and Robert Jeffrey agree: they argue that political engagement 
improves as a result of citizenship education, but criticise its treatment as a ‘politicised 
panacea’ envisaged as the answer to every social ill. Murray Print’s study of citizenship 
education in Australia makes the fascinating point that the ‘informal curriculum’ is just as 
important as the formal curriculum in producing the kind of outcomes desired from 
citizenship education. As such he notes the importance of democratically organised student 
organisations, including student government, as well as student newspapers, debating, 
fundraising activities, etc. According to Print, engagement in these activities is positively 
correlated with civic and political engagement as an adult. However, too often schools treat 
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the informal curriculum in this regard as low-value, which infects students’ valuation of these 
activities.62 
 
Political training 
The main agents for training young people in the skills required for political participation are 
political parties; whether they succeed in this regard, judged on their own terms, is arguable. 
Furthermore, political training and socialisation offered exclusively via the party system 
seems not to chime with young people’s attitudes towards political participation. It may be, 
therefore, that other sources of passing on political skills and expertise are required. Farthing 
argues such training is vital to empowering young people – simply educating young people 
about existing political structures and process is insufficient.63 
There are useful examples of political training for young people in the UK. For example, the 
Citizenship Foundation’s Youth Act, which aimed to help people aged between 11 and 18 to 
build political campaigns within their local communities, the Carnegie Young People Initiative 
(CYPI), and the work of the British Youth Council.64 We can refer also to the work of Citizens 
UK and London Citizens in training for ‘community organisers’; although this is not explicitly 
targeted at young people there are clearly affinities with the way that young people tend to 
approach political participation.65 
Clearly, the objectives among such programmes vary, and overlap. They can be said to be 
focused on enabling participation by young people in new forms of political participation, 
enabling the political activities undertaken by young people to be more impactful upon formal 
politics, and perhaps most importantly, encouraging existing young activists to demonstrate 
leadership in encouraging more young people to get involved in political activity. The impact 
of training in these forms on the democratic deficit is of course unclear, but it is hard to 
dispute the argument that such training is valuable in its own right. 
 
New civic institutions 
The second section cited the research of Constance Flanagan et al on the impact of 
protracted transitions to adulthood on political engagement in the United States, which found 
that young people not in higher education are excluded from forms of early political 
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socialisation associated with the workplace and engagement with local community activities. 
They also conducted research of AmeriCorps, a new institutional form designed to increase 
the involvement of Americans in providing services at the local level, in return for training. 
While not intended solely for young people, the overwhelming majority of participants are 
aged between 18 and 30. Participants are employed for a year on a full-time basis, and 
receive a small stipend for living expenses and an award towards future or previous 
educational expenses. While not designed to increase political engagement directly – 
associated legislation forbids AmeriCorps participants from engaging in political activity – 
Flanagan et al found that the programme increases civic engagement and ultimately political 
activity over the medium-term (they also refer to specific features of the programme which 
have greatest effect in this regard).66 
The coalition government’s National Citizen Service (NCS) resembles AmeriCorps, albeit on 
a much smaller scale; it is aimed at only 16 and 17 year-olds, and lasts for only three 
weeks.67 Concerns over costs are hampering a wider roll-out of the scheme.68 Clearly, the 
NCS cannot be expected to achieve results equivalent to AmeriCorps, but as Flanagan et al 
point out, AmeriCorps itself is not a panacea for political socialisation during the transition to 
adulthood. But their research does demonstrate the importance of civic institutions for young 
people outside educational establishments. Organisations explicitly designed to encourage 
political activity may be overlooking deeper causes of young people’s disaffection, that is, an 
absence of associational bonds. 
 
Democratic institutions 
Formal role for young people’s forums 
Attempts to engineer the composition of the electorate, legislatures or electorates in order to 
produce outcomes that mitigate the intergenerational democratic deficit will probably always 
face the charge, however unfair it may be, that they undermine the one person, one vote 
principle. However, under this option, young people are given a formal role or status within 
democratic institutions without being more heavily represented in formal decision-making 
processes than their actual voting rates would permit under the existing system. Simply, 
young people would have an advisory status within the deliberations of legislative functions 
of elected assemblies, at most or all levels of authority, including the House of Commons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	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There are perhaps strong grounds for a wide range of ‘minority’ groups in some ways under-
represented in democratic life to have similar opportunities – it is not the intent of this paper 
to argue the case for young people ahead of other groups who may be disenfranchised. Yet 
it is nevertheless vital that the rapid and ongoing impact of population ageing on the 
traditional balance between generations within the democratic process is recognised. While 
there may be important barriers to the effective representation of other groups, young people 
by definition have not reached the life-stage at which they are likely to be in a position to, for 
instance, stand for election for a political party in a ‘winnable’ seat at any level. It may be for 
precisely this reason that a ‘quota’ system (discussed below) compelling legislatures to 
include young people would be inappropriate – in contrast to, for argument’s sake, the 
representation of women. Ensuring, more modestly, that young people’s voices are heard 
within the internal deliberations of democratic institutions would therefore strike a fair 
balance. 
There would of course be ancillary benefits to democracy of this plan: firstly, the presence of 
young people in democratic institutions would not only ensure their voices are heard, but 
could also help to nurture intergenerational understanding. Secondly, the young people 
selected as advisers would be in a position to mobilise their peers to take an interest in 
formal politics. 
The main difficulties lie in issues around selection and representation. Would it be desirable, 
most radically, for young people to have an additional vote (at all elections) through which 
they elect their peers onto forums which sit within legislatures, albeit without voting power? 
This system would be difficult and expensive for electoral authorities to administer. It also 
seems implausible, logistically, that mass elections of this type will produce results that are 
meaningfully representative of young people’s preferences. It would almost certainly require 
viable candidates to be supported by mainstream political parties; while this may serve to 
attract some young people into party membership, equally it is likely to skew the 
representativeness of these elections. 
Despite the danger of paternalism, a process of co-option by legislatures would surely be 
more appropriate and feasible. There are of course many organisations that seek to 
represent young people, many of which incorporate the input of young people themselves 
into their internal governance procedures. Involving these organisations in the co-option 
process would be desirable – although again, as with political parties, there is the danger 
that young people’s forums would then simply reflect existing patterns of political 
engagement rather than reaching out to the unengaged. There can be no one-size-fits-all 
solution to these dilemmas. Rather, the design of forums should be tailored to the institution 
and geographical area in question. Within the House of Commons, for instances, groups 
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such as the National Union of Students and the British Youth Council would probably have 
designated seats on the advisory forum. In general, however, it would be advisable for 
legislatures to work with a wide range of groups in constructing young people’s forums, 
including third sector organisations, parties, schools, universities and youth-based 
community groups. The composition of forums would be kept under review, with the opinions 
of young people themselves sought on a regular basis. There should also be an expectation 
that the various organisations offered a seat on the forum would select their representatives 
by democratic means (and the forum itself would be organised democratically for internal 
processes); the appointing legislature could in fact insist that democratic procedures are 
adhered to among the forum’s constituent organisations. 
 
All-young people shortlists 
The representation of women in the House of Commons has been boosted significantly by 
the use of all-women shortlists for the selection of candidates for parliamentary seats, 
although they have only been employed by the Labour Party. Clearly, there is no reason to 
assume that a geographical area would be represented any less effectively by a female 
rather than male MP, and all-women shortlists were imposed by the Labour leadership in 
order to circumvent the apparent bias among local parties towards selecting male 
candidates (albeit perhaps inadvertently, because women are less likely to be active party 
members in many areas – local parties have in most cases not opposed the introduction of 
all-women shortlists). 
Unfortunately, the same logic does not apply to young people. Precisely because of the 
profound importance of life-stage to an individual’s political preferences – which underpins 
this paper’s analysis of the disenfranchisement of young people – it seems fair to concede 
that some voters would be less effectively represented if their choice of candidates was 
restricted to only people below a certain age. 
However, it is worth reiterating that this option does not concern individuals standing for 
election, but rather standing for selection as their party’s candidate for a given election. It is 
therefore entirely a matter for political parties to determine how they select their candidates 
(within the legal parameters of the party system, which have actually been clarified as a 
result of all-women shortlists). Even if a party’s leadership chooses not to impose all-young 
people shortlists on an area, at least not for parliamentary seats, they could instead allow 
local party members to choose to select their candidates via an all-young people shortlist, if 
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local party leaders favoured this option.69 They could, furthermore, ensure that young people 
are adequately represented among the available candidates for election, even if not 
guaranteed selection. And they could also offer far more resources to their party’s youth 
sections to ensure, firstly, that young people are adequately represented at all levels of the 
party, and secondly, that existing youth sections are able to genuinely engage with young 
people within their communities both inside and outside the party membership. 
 
Quotas of young people in legislatures 
Insisting that young people are proportionately represented in legislatures such as the 
House of Commons would be a radical transformation for the UK political system. Most 
obviously, it would be impossible to implement under the single-member FPTP electoral 
system. It would therefore necessitate an electoral system where outcomes are more directly 
proportional to the actual votes cast. This might mean larger, multi-member constituencies 
which would guarantee a seat in Parliament to the highest-placed young person (or several 
young people, dependent on the number of seats in the constituency), irrespective of their 
performance vis-à-vis older candidates a seat in Parliament. Alternatively, single-member 
constituencies may be retained, but the composition of the House of Commons would be 
‘topped up’ by a certain number of seats elected by a more proportional system – young 
people would be guaranteed a certain proportion of the top-up seats.70 
It would be far easier to achieve a quota of young people, whether formally or informally, in 
the House of Lords, where seats are awarded by appointment. Yet the influence of the 
young members in the political system in general would, inevitably, be far less significant. An 
elected House of Lords, which has been proposed by the Liberal Democrats in government, 
would of course take away the government’s ability to appoint a quota of young members. 
However, it may nevertheless be more acceptable to the electorate in general (and 
consistent with democratic principles) that young people have a guaranteed number of seats 
in the second chamber, even if it is elected rather than appointed, because the second 
chamber’s role is focused on scrutiny rather than executive functions. 
Yet the difficulties associated with quotas in the House of Commons do not mean that more 
modest changes cannot be instituted within the main chamber to achieve some of the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  It	  would	  presumably	  be	  easier	  for	  party	  leaders	  to	  impose	  all-­‐young	  people	  shortlists	  in	  multi-­‐member	  
constituencies,	  such	  as	  local	  authority	  wards	  and	  European	  Parliament	  constituencies.	  
70	  Less	  radically,	  the	  electoral	  system	  could	  insist	  that	  parties	  include	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  young	  people	  in	  any	  
election	  where	  an	  open	  list	  is	  used	  –	  it	  would	  be	  up	  to	  the	  electorate	  to	  decide,	  young	  people	  having	  been	  
given	  a	  favourable	  position	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  candidates.	  Or	  where	  a	  closed	  list	  is	  used,	  meaning	  electors	  
cannot	  choose	  between	  candidates	  but	  only	  parties,	  the	  electoral	  system	  could	  insist	  that	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  
young	  candidates	  are	  highly	  placed	  in	  parties’	  lists.	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objectives. Alternatively, therefore, a small number of seats – or even a single seat – where 
the representatives were chosen only by young voters, could be established within the 
House of Commons.71 Young people would essentially have two votes: one within their 
geographical constituency, and one for the young people’s seats. This small group of 
representatives, or single representative, would inevitably become the voice of young people 
within the democratic system.72 Of course, this would not mean that young people’s votes 
were worth double that of other age groups. If we assume for argument’s sake that only 
people aged under 25 are able to ‘vote twice’, in 2010 there would have been nearly 6 
million electors for these seats (compared to an average geographical constituency size of 
under 70,000). Furthermore, this system could be used to offer the same deal to the oldest 
cohorts who, while not affected by the outcomes of elections for as great a portion of their 
life as young voters, are affected by small cohort size in terms of potential voting power. 
Ostensibly this compromise would undermine the value of young people’s seats in 
Parliament, although in practice the value of this system is not in re-balancing power within 
the legislature, but rather in establishing a mechanism for young people’s voices to be 
heard. A similar mechanism for the oldest voters would not undermine this, and may in fact 
be conducive to positive relations between different generations.73 
 
Governance 
Calculating the impact of policy on different age cohorts 
The options considered in this section are not ostensibly part of the democratic process. 
However, they would to some extent constitute a constraint upon the politicians elected 
through the democratic process, therefore limit the impact of disenfranchisement on young 
people. 
Equality Impact Assessments (EqIAs) are generally carried out when any significant change 
of policy or expenditure is announced by the government (and most local authorities). Young 
people are included in these assessments, under the ‘equality strand’ of age. There does not 
appear to be any definitive approach to defining young people across government 
departments, but the Greater London Authority is more precise, and assesses three age-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  The	  system	  could	  be	  replicated	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  
72	  The	  benefit	  of	  this	  ‘seat’	  being	  filled	  by	  more	  than	  one	  MP	  is	  that	  young	  people	  would	  potentially	  be	  able	  to	  
select	  representatives	  with	  different	  party	  affiliations.	  
73	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  according	  to	  research	  published	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  Library	  in	  
2005,	  the	  number	  of	  MPs	  aged	  70	  or	  over	  is	  roughly	  proportionate	  to	  the	  number	  of	  voters	  aged	  70	  or	  over	  in	  
the	  electorate	  in	  general.	  Having	  said	  this,	  there	  may	  be	  grounds	  for	  a	  seat,	  or	  seats,	  chosen	  only	  by	  the	  ‘oldest	  
old’,	  that	  is,	  those	  aged	  80	  or	  over.	  See	  Cracknell,	  Richard	  (2005)	  Social	  Background	  of	  MPs	  (House	  of	  
Commons	  Library),	  available	  at	  www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/notes/snsg-­‐01528.pdf.	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based ‘equality target groups’ of children under 16, young people aged between 16 and 25, 
and older people aged 65 or over. 
It is far from clear, however, that EqIAs are successful in ensuring the impact on young 
people is considered in policy decisions. Firstly, while EqIA analysis may be taken into 
account when making decisions, there is no guarantee that ministers, for instance, will heed 
the analysis. Invariably, as political documents compiled by officials but signed-off by 
ministers, there is an endemic tendency for EqIAs to downplay negative impacts on any 
equality group. Secondly, it is probably fair to say that EqIAs are not particularly 
sophisticated. The immediate impact on certain age groups may be considered, but this is 
not the same as considering the lifecourse implications of policy or public expenditure 
changes on young people at a crucial stage of life. Similarly, even if an EqIA for a measure 
which increases expenditure demonstrates positive implications across several equality 
strands, including for young people themselves, the analysis will rarely, if ever, take into 
account the impact on young people of funding this measure over their lifecourse.74 
Fourthly, it is not clear what the implications of a conflict within the age strand are. Clearly, 
while we should be wary of exaggerating this possibility, some measures that have the 
potential to benefit older people may also have the potential to harm younger people 
(especially, again, if funding is considered). The age-based impact may be positive overall – 
but one age group will be sacrificing its interests for another. And finally, EqIAs are rarely 
undertaken in relation to government expenditure or fiscal policy as a whole, that is, 
following budgets or spending reviews. After pressure from campaigners, HM Treasury 
published in 2010 an extremely limited impact assessment of the spending review, which 
considered briefly the impact of cuts in public expenditure on women (five paragraphs), 
ethnic minorities (six paragraphs) and people with disabilities (seven paragraphs), but 
neither older people nor young people.75 
It is not possible here to re-design the type of impact assessments undertaken by 
government. It seems clear, however, that the totality of costs and benefits (broadly defined) 
for all age cohorts, over their lifecourse, of every major decision taken by political authorities 
should be assessed and published. Certainly, the practice assessing the impact of decisions 
in isolation should be supplemented by a firmer commitment to assessing the impact of 
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  Similarly,	  cost/benefit	  analyses	  undertaken	  by	  government	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  disaggregate	  taxpayers	  when	  
considering	  the	  ‘value	  for	  money’	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  policy	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75	  HM	  Treasury	  (2010)	  Overview	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  Spending	  Review	  2010	  on	  Equalities,	  available	  at	  cdn.hm-­‐
treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_equalities.pdf.	  See	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  Campbell,	  Beatrix	  (2010)	  ‘The	  Fawcett	  Society	  takes	  the	  cuts	  to	  
court’	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  22	  October	  2010,	  available	  at	  www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/oct/22/yvette-­‐
cooper-­‐fawcett-­‐society-­‐cuts.	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overall government activity; an enhanced role for the Office of Budget Responsibility may 
help to facilitate this approach. 
 
An ombudsman for young people 
As individuals technically appointed by Parliament to represent the interests of certain 
groups, or to scrutinise on behalf of the public in general the activities of government, 
ombudsmen have a vital role in the democratic process. Currently England has a Children’s 
Commissioner who acts on behalf of children and young people up to the age of 18 (or 21 in 
limited circumstances) – there are similar posts in the devolved nations – yet the 
Commissioner’s role is focused largely on child protection issues. In terms of democracy, 
ombudsmen are not elected, so it is not immediately apparent that an ombudsman for young 
people would serve to address the democratic deficit in any direct sense. Their role could be 
seen as quite paternalistic, reinforcing the assumption that young people are not full citizens. 
However, an ombudsman would establish that, irrespective of the age profile of the 
electorate, the perspective of young people is vital to the democratic process and the 
legitimacy of the democratic system. That ombudsmen are appointed by Parliament 
(although generally these powers are granted to the government) means that ultimately the 
electorate would have the authority to determine the function of and resources available to 
the ombudsman for young people. 
Yet there are obvious limitations to the impact an ombudsman may have on policy. The 
value of ombudsmen often lies in ensuring that elected politicians adhere to the law, 
particularly human rights law. In the case of young people, whose disadvantage is financial 
or economic, an ombudsman for young people may have less impact. It may be preferable 
therefore to establish a government minister for young people. Currently, there are limited 
incentives within government for ministers to take responsibility for the circumstances of 
young people in general. There are few rewards on offer for ministers admitting that their 
policies may be failing a particular age group in some way. Should there be a single minister, 
therefore, whose primary responsibility is ensuring that government departments take into 
account the current and future impacts on young people of policy and expenditure 
decisions? Highlighting the ‘bad news’ would be in their job description, and furthermore, as 
a government minister their identity and performance is more likely to be deliberated through 
the formal democratic process.76 
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  Interestingly,	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There are (limited) precursors to the idea of a minister for young people. Ivan Lewis became 
the inaugural minister for young people and learning during Labour’s third term in office, 
based in the Department for Children, Schools and Families (now Department for Education) 
The post has now been abolished, but in any case, it is not clear that this role would have 
facilitated cross-governmental action on behalf of young people. There also exists the 
Government Equalities Office (GEO), once an independent department but now subsumed 
within the Home Office, with two ministers. Theresa May combines the role of minister for 
women and equality with the far more demanding role of Home Secretary, and Lynne 
Featherstone combines the role of minister for equalities with the role of minister for criminal 
information. The GEO does in theory have a cross-governmental role, principally in ensuring 
that departments adhere to the Equality Act 2010. But it has limited resources or institutional 
levers, and furthermore, it is not clear that either minister has the authority, or inclination, to 
adjudicate on matters where the interests of different age groups may conflict. 
Clearly, there are many organisational and political complexities associated with the idea of 
a minister for young people. An ombudsman, operating at a critical distance from 
government, may be better placed to achieve these objectives – although the 
representativeness of the position would be a permanent limitation. 
 
Intergenerational charter 
Based on research on young people in Australia, academic Judith Bessant has advocated 
an ‘intergenerational charter’, a constitutional agreement between citizens with the legal and 
moral force of, say, a human rights declaration.77 Bessant argues that political leaders in 
Australia have used ideas around intergenerational equity and protecting future generations 
to justify a neoliberal economic policy programme – including reducing public expenditure, 
both to reduce debt and promote growth through tax cuts – which may not in fact be in the 
interests of young people. 
This is not the place to speculate in detail about the content of an intergenerational charter 
(nor does Bessant), but we can assume that any such charter would establish the basis of a 
decent lifecourse for individuals and families – going beyond simply proclaiming the basic 
tenets of a civilised society, that is, the minimalist approach of human rights charters. The 
charter would establish also the duties owed by each generation to others, or perhaps more 
precisely, how we can expect to be treated by fellow citizens at different life-stages. 
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  minister	  for	  young	  people,	  establishing	  a	  ministerial	  post	  to	  address	  intergenerational	  issues	  may	  be	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Crucially, Bessant argues that an intergenerational charter must be deliberative in nature, 
inspired by the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. It would intimately involve each citizen, 
including young people, in decisions around its form and content. Moreover, deliberation 
would be central not only to its creation but also how it operates in practice: an 
intergenerational charter would guarantee an equal say in public life for different age 
cohorts, irrespective of their relative size within the electorate. 
The main difficulty with the notion of an intergenerational charter, especially in terms of 
overcoming the democratic deficit, is that it does not adhere fully to democratic principles 
and the sovereignty of the electoral process within representative democracies.78 On the one 
hand, this is a strength: it means that young people’s perspectives are granted equal status 
even though young cohorts may be smaller. On the other hand, it is perhaps naïve to 
assume that the existence of the charter will guarantee the protection of young people’s 
interests, given that larger cohorts remain able to protect their interests through the formal 
democratic process. Essentially, like a human rights charter, an intergenerational charter 
would be a constraint upon the decisions that democratically-elected governments can make 
in office. Even if the charter is created originally by democratic means, future electorates 
may insist on the right of elected representatives to alter the charter. Human rights are never 
entirely timeless, but the kind of rights and obligations associated with an intergenerational 
charter would presumably be so culturally and temporally specific, and highly relevant to the 
daily business of governance, that they would be kept under constant review – and would 
presumably be open to perennial legal challenge. Bessant argues in response that ‘an 
intergenerational charter is not a radical departure from democratic principles, but is 
consistent with core democratic values. It can embellish the values and practices that 
constitute equity, participation and inclusion while helping to secure political legitimacy.’ 
 
Protection for future citizens 
Calculating the impact of policy on future generations 
The desirability of calculating the impact of policy decisions on young people, and indeed all 
age groups, was discussed above. Similar mechanisms for impacts on future generations 
can be justified on the same basis. Two additional points are worth noting here: firstly, 
despite the fact that governments, increasingly often, claim to be making decisions based on 
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the interests of future generations, there are no formal mechanisms guaranteeing that future 
citizens’ interests are considered in the policy-making process. This contrasts with existing 
young people, who are included in EqIAs, albeit not in a satisfactory manner. 
Secondly, the difficulty associated with assessing the impacts on citizens not yet alive. For 
this reason, it is logical to argue that it is impossible to authoritatively gauge the impact on 
future citizens, and therefore determine how best to protect them. However, even if analyses 
of future impacts are not binding on policy-makers for this reason, it does not mean that this 
information (albeit imperfect) does not constitute a valuable contribution to the democratic 
process. Furthermore, children not yet able to vote should also be considered future citizens 
in this regard. It was noted above that EqIAs focus on assessing the immediate impacts of 
decisions. On this basis, the impacts on children today are taken into account, but not the 
lifecourse implications. Even if it is impossible to assess the impact on citizens not yet born, 
this surely applies less to citizens alive but under the voting age. 
 
An ombudsman for future citizens 
As with votes for parents, Hungary leads the world in attempting to protect the interests of 
future citizens. There exists in Hungary a fully functioning Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Future Generations. The Commissioner receives petitions from the public to investigate 
whether government decisions will negatively impact on future generations. According to 
Kirsty Schneeberger, writing in 2012, the Commissioner had received over 400 petitions 
since 2008, and had issued reports to parliament on 70 of these.79 An ombudsman for future 
citizens may be justified on similar grounds to an ombudsman for young people, discussed 
above – indeed, it may again be preferable to establish a ministerial position for future 
citizens to enable cross-governmental action. Furthermore, while it is difficult at the level of 
principle – given the individualistic nature of human rights – to justify this kind of special 
protection for young people who, after all, are entitled to vote, this caveat may not apply to 
future citizens. That future generations by definition have no voice within the democratic 
process means that it may breach their human rights to be unduly burdened by the 
outcomes of today’s democratic process. The question, then, becomes one of whether 
citizens not yet alive can be said to hold inviolable rights as human beings. 
One of the reasons that Hungary has been able to establish an ombudsman for future 
generations is that the Hungarian constitution bestows citizens a right to a clean and healthy 
environment. Accordingly, most submissions to the ombudsman relate to ecological issues. 
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As Schneeberger points out, ‘it is this right that underpins the very existence of the 
[ombudsman], and it is the absence of such a right that has led to some thinkers to argue 
that such a role could not exist in the UK’. Of course, the burdens placed on future 
generations, discussed in the first section, are not composed solely of ecological issues. The 
Hungarian ombudsman’s reliance on the constitutional right to a healthy environment may 
therefore be seen as a constraint. As such, Schneeberger adds that 
the UK is perhaps better placed to establish an ombudsman with a broader remit 
than the Hungarian one: it might be feasible to instead focus on building on the 
rights to fair tax and pensions policies, for instance, with environmental priorities 
a part of the ombudsman’s broader portfolio. 
 
Legal limits on burdens for future citizens 
As indicated by the discussion above, it will always be difficult to justify constraining the 
actions of democratically elected governments, solely on the basis that the interests of some 
groups of voters are not served by the outcomes of elections – especially if these groups 
have not used their vote. However, citizens not yet alive have much more justification for 
demanding constraints upon what governments may do in office, even if democratically 
elected, because they do not have a vote. There have always been boundaries to the 
practice of democratic citizenship, such as the inadequacy of resources, the influence of 
foreign powers, and more recently, the establishment of inviolable human rights. Given that 
political authorities, and society in general, increasingly have the capacity – and arguably, 
the inclination – to burden unenfranchised future generations, intergenerational equity 
appears to necessitate a further constraint upon democracy for the sake of future citizens. 
Indeed, Judith Bessant argues that future generations should be represented symbolically in 
an intergenerational charter.80 The charter would not only establish our duties to citizens at 
other life-stages, but also future citizens. Clearly, she is right about the need to protect future 
generations, and as such an intergenerational charter may be an important part of this 
protection, but that future generations cannot possibly themselves be party to this charter, 
which would be deliberative in nature and operation, is a more significant problem than 
Bessant admits. However the symbolic representation of future generations is achieved, 
within the political system in general as well as the intergenerational charter, there will 
inevitably be an element of paternalism in the efforts of current citizens to protect future 
citizens – and no guarantee that current citizens will agree on how the interests of future 
citizens are best served. 
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There is of course no alternative to a paternalistic approach, rather than democratic, to 
protecting future citizens.81 But given this reality, it suggests that a stronger set of constraints 
than an intergenerational charter would encompass are required, specifically for future 
generations. As current citizens must we compel ourselves, legally, to protect future 
citizens? 
Agreeing to this edict, however, does not mean that legal limits on the burdens we may 
bestow are realisable in practice. A vast range of policy decisions may have long-term 
implications, even if the initial decision is eventually reversed – sometimes these implications 
will be inadvertent. Opinion on whether these implications are positive or negative will 
inevitably vary, not least because the implications are ultimately unknowable. The example 
of ‘extended working lives’ is an interesting case in point. If older people are required to work 
for longer, as a result of eligibility ages for pension provision being raised, does this benefit 
future generations? In the early part of their life they will, other things being equal, be 
required to pay less tax and lower pension contributions (depending on type of scheme) as a 
result of pension liabilities being reduced. But future citizens will be old one day too – they 
may be retired for almost as long as they are of working age. It is plausible to argue, 
therefore, that they too are served by a pension system based on high contributions with 
generous retirement provisions. Compelling older people to work for longer may have an 
impact on the job opportunities available to younger generations – but even if this is the 
case, it may in fact lead to society placing greater emphasis on education for young people, 
which would arguably be in the interests of future citizens, especially if it involves investment 
in educational infrastructure. With more older people in the labour market, the informal 
provision of childcare by grandparents may be reduced. This may negatively affect future 
generations over the very short-term, but on the other hand, is it right for society to become 
reliant on grandparental care rather than enabling a better work/life balance for parents 
themselves? And how can we possibly know what future citizens will think about these 
issues when they become parents, or grandparents? 
Given these uncertainties, there may be a strong case for favouring the option discussed 
above, establishing a requirement to consider the impact of policy on future citizens, rather 
than legal limits on what governments may do in office. However, while any system based 
on legal guarantees will be open to interpretation, any system without these guarantees will 
be open to ‘abuse’ by current electorates. The fairest solution may be to establish a 
permanent, independent commission to adjudicate on how to protect future generations, 
composed of experts from a range of professions. This option is not dissimilar to the idea of 
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an ombudsman for future citizens, but the commission would have greater legal authority to 
influence and where necessary reverse government decisions. The most appropriate 
comparator in the current political system is not ombudsmen, but rather competition 
authorities such as the Office of Fair Trading, which have a quasi-judicial role in determining 
whether private sector firms have breached competition rules. Their work is based on a legal 
code, but this is only applied on the basis of detailed analysis of actual market conditions. 
The difference here is that, like most ombudsmen, the commission would be adjudicating on 
government decisions rather than market activity. The government (and local authorities, 
devolved executives, etc.) would have the right to challenge the commission’s decisions 
through the formal judicial system. It would of course be naïve to assume that the 
commission could escape politics entirely, or adequately ‘represent’ future citizens in any 
meaningful – these dilemmas are ineradicable. 
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Appendix: possible objections 
This appendix addresses the likely objections, to both the notion of an intergenerational 
democratic deficit, and some of the ideas discussed in the third section. 
 
“Democracy means one 
person one vote” 
The principle of one person, one vote is already refracted in 
practice by innumerable factors related to the cultural, 
economic and institutional context within which any system of 
democracy is established, chiefly the paradigm of 
‘representative democracy’. The political system must 
unquestionably remain based on this principle, but aspects of 
the wider system, and the context within which the system 
operates, that undermine the enfranchisement of any group 
must be addressed. 
“Democracy should be 
blind to age differences” 
The democratic process takes into account a range of 
demographic characteristics, both formally and informally. The 
validation of all-women shortlists is a recent case in point. The 
reality that young people will, in general, be affected by the 
outcomes of the democratic process for longer than any other 
age group is ineradicable – and should be taken into account 
as democracy evolves. Traditionally, democracies have 
operated within a pyramid-shaped demographic context; the 
transformation of this context must be acknowledged. 
“Young people should 
not be privileged within 
the political system” 
As a matter of principle, no age group should be unduly 
privileged within the political system. But a system based on 
one person, one vote will penalise small cohort sizes, whether 
of younger or older voters. By definition, young people live 
with the consequences of political decisions for longer; 
furthermore, they are at a crucial life-stage where the impact 
of political decisions will have a decisive and cumulative effect 
on their socio-economic circumstances and life chances 
across their lifecourses. The legitimacy of the democratic 
process may therefore be undermined if young people are 
consistently out-voted. 
“Individuals do not vote 
solely on the basis of 
their age” 
 
 
Evidence suggests age is a significant factor in political 
decisions, and that there is a significant correlation between 
cohort size and the achievement of policy outcomes that suit 
the interests of particular cohorts. Furlong and Cartmel 
directly, and JG TP in general. People of the same generation 
may well vote for different political parties, and their political 
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“Individuals do not vote 
solely on the basis of 
their age” [cont’d] 
preferences may change over time, but generally speaking 
generational perspectives will influence the broad political 
agenda within which all parties seek to garner support. 
Furthermore, at the individual level, life-stage and 
generational identity have an impact upon how and whether 
people engage with the democratic process. They may 
interpret their interests in different ways, but this does not 
mean that perceptions of their generational interests are not 
crucial to their political behaviour. 
“Older people have 
greater levels of 
experience required for 
political leadership, and 
younger people by 
definition lack maturity” 
Life experience is certainly an important trait for elected 
representatives. But although experience generally increases 
with age, this is not necessarily the case. Older cohorts will 
have been young once – but in almost all cases, in very 
different conditions from contemporary young people. Greater 
experience of, essentially, the passage of time cannot 
adequately compensate for a lack of directly relevant 
experience of these conditions. Maturity is obviously a 
subjective judgement, and nevertheless, the perspective of 
young people is inimitable. 
“16 year olds are not 
mature enough to vote” 
The line between childhood and adulthood will to some extent 
always be arbitrary. Yet in many other walks of life, 16 year-
olds are considered old enough to take responsibility for their 
decisions. Most obviously, a society that has decided not to 
protect 16 year-olds from military service cannot deny this age 
group the vote and claim to be democratic. 
“The extent of population 
ageing has been 
exaggerated” 
Population ageing is a very recent phenomenon; pensioners 
began to out-number children only in the last five years. In 
substantive terms, population ageing has not yet happened, 
but will accelerate in coming decades. There may of course 
be benefits to living in an older society, but the implications for 
democracy must be assessed. 
“Young people choose 
not to use their vote – 
disenfranchisement is 
their own fault” 
The idea that non-voting is a choice, and therefore an 
indication of apathy or even contentment, is far too simplistic. 
We need to consider the ‘supply’ of democratic life, such as 
the nature and role of political parties, as well as ‘demand’ for 
politics. Choosing not to participate in elections may be a 
profoundly political act which is not recognised by the formal 
democratic process. Non-voting is also complicated by the 
problem of non-registration. The fact that many young people 
are not registered to vote (as a result of moving home, rather 
than conscious choice) means that they are unable to vote, 
and do not receive a formal prompt in the form of a polling 
card. 
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“Many young people are 
already engaged in 
politics – those not 
engaged have no 
excuse” 
The fact that many young people do participate in politics 
dispels the myth of youth apathy. But the forms of participation 
favoured by young people are not rewarded by the formal 
democratic process. Evidence suggests that the main divide 
within youth politics is not between activists and non-activists 
(as they share a distrust of formal politics) but rather between 
young people involved in politics as a career choice, and 
young people involved to advance a particular cause. 
“It is impossible to 
engineer the electorate 
to produce 
generationally fair 
outcomes” 
One person, one vote must remain the foundational principle 
of democratic organisation, which means ultimately larger age 
cohorts will always have greater voting power. But the 
democratic process is highly complex; there are myriad ways 
on enhancing the enfranchisement of certain groups without 
undermining this principle. Moreover, options such as votes at 
16 and parental votes would send a clear message about the 
importance of young people to the democratic process while 
reinforcing this principle. 
“Increasing the election 
turnout out of young 
people would have the 
most significant impact 
on the intergenerational 
democratic deficit” 
Higher turnout rates among young voters would go a long way 
to equalising the actual power exercised by different 
generations within the democratic process. Yet higher turnout 
is not a panacea; wider biases against young people also 
need to be addressed, and demographic change means that 
even with 100 per cent turnout older cohorts will become 
dominant. Mandatory voting would therefore not be an 
effective remedy for the intergenerational democratic deficit. 
“Measures to support 
young people are a 
recipe for conflict 
between generations” 
The emergence of intergenerational conflict is already evident 
in the UK – it will worsen if the disenfranchisement of young 
people is not addressed. Having said this, any reforms to the 
democratic process must seek to maximise the possibility of 
sound intergenerational relations. 
“Future demographic 
change might mean that 
young people become 
dominant” 
The dominance of any age group within the electorate is 
problematic for democracy. But we can be confident that 
electorate will age significantly in coming decades – the trend 
is for life expectancy increases to be under-estimated rather 
than over-estimated. Given that the 18 year-olds of 2030 are 
already alive, so we know for certain that the age imbalance 
within the electorate will persist for the next two decades. 
Furthermore, the intergenerational democratic deficit derives 
from more than the relative size of age cohorts. 
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“Quotas of young people 
in legislatures would be 
undemocratic” 
 
“Quotas of young people 
in legislatures would be 
undemocratic” [contd] 
Clearly, prescribing a minimum number for any age group 
within democratic institutions contradicts basic principles of 
democracy. However, legislatures could establish forums of 
young people who become members in an advisory capacity. 
Alternatively, a small number of seats could be elected only by 
young people (the representatives themselves would not be 
required to be under a certain age). It is also possible that 
political parties, as independent bodies, will choose to offer 
more support for the selection of younger candidates – the 
electorate would of course retain the right not to vote for these 
candidates. 
“The oldest old are also 
under-represented” 
People aged 80 or over appear to be under-represented in 
democratic institutions. Clearly, 80-somethings are not 
equivalent to new retirees aged around 65. It may be fair to 
offer this age group protection within the democratic process, 
along the lines of any protection offered to young people. 
“The oldest old do not 
vote in the same 
proportion as people in 
their 60s and 70s, so 
their political power is 
exaggerated” 
This is almost certainly correct. It is therefore unfair to claim 
that people aged 80 or over, for instance, exercise political 
power greater than or equivalent to younger cohorts. We 
should study the political behaviour of the oldest old in more 
detail and, where necessary, protect them within the 
democratic process. By the same token, however, the fact that 
everybody aged 65 or over is assumed to have the same 
turnout rate means that the actual political power of voters in 
their late-60s and 70s in significantly under-estimated. 
“The government needs 
to borrow, and grow the 
economy, to invest in 
public services which 
will benefit future 
generations” 
Whether accurate or not, economic theories do not alone 
justify jeopardising the democratic freedoms of future citizens. 
Creating obligations that will only be met by people not yet 
alive has always been questionable from the perspective of 
democracy. Yet in recent years the state’s ability to burden 
future generations appears to have increased, despite the 
commitment to protecting future generations often espoused 
by politicians. Even if it is fair to assume that long-term 
borrowing, for instance, will benefit future generations, 
governments have offered few guarantees regarding this 
outcome. Furthermore, this assumption is probably not 
sufficient justification for creating the risk that current practices 
will jeopardise the political citizenship of future generations.  
“It is impossible to 
assess the impacts of 
policy on future 
citizens” 
We will never be able to definitively determine what the impact 
of today’s policy decisions will be upon future generations. 
However, the possibility that future citizens will be adversely 
affected by decisions demands far greater attention than it is 
currently afforded by policy-makers. 
 
